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Illegal Marijuana Cultivation on Public 
Lands: Our Federalism on a Very Bad 
Trip1 
The morality and legality of marijuana is becoming secondary to the 
environmental damage.2 
 
Hope M. Babcock* 
 Fueled by increasing demand for marijuana, illegal cultivation of the 
drug on public lands is causing massive environmental harm. The federal 
government lacks the resources to wage what would be a difficult and costly 
campaign to eradicate these illegal grow sites and instead focuses its limited 
resources on enforcing the federal marijuana ban. Marijuana 
decriminalization might allow legally grown marijuana to squeeze out its 
illegal counterpart, but the political likelihood of decriminalization is low. The 
key is reducing demand for the illegal drug by changing public buying 
preferences. However, doing this depends on an available legal alternative. 
This Article discusses several behavioral modification approaches as a way of 
changing consumer preferences and possible ways to resolve the current 
conflict between state marijuana legalization and its federal criminalization. 
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        1.   Jonathan H. Adler, Marijuana, Federal Power and the States, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 505, 
512 (2015) (commenting on “the inevitable interjurisdictional conflicts and legal quandaries that will 
arise” from the federalism conflicts engendered by state efforts to decriminalize and regulate marijuana 
use for medical and even recreational purposes and federal law criminalizing these activities, Professor 
Jonathan Adler quips “This is our federalism on drugs, and it’s going to be an interesting trip.”). 
 2.  Sharon Levy, Pot Poisons Public Lands, 64 BIOSCIENCE 265, 269 (2014), http://biosci-
ence.oxfordjournals.org/content/64/4/265.full.pdf. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The production of marijuana is fast becoming a booming business.3 As 
more states and local jurisdictions legalize the use of cannabis for medical or 
recreational purposes, demand for the plant is growing.4 However, the market 
for marijuana is largely supplied by plants grown illegally. There are serious 
environmental impacts from these activities, whether they occur in private 
homes or on public lands. Both types of cultivation require high energy use and 
water consumption while causing unrestricted use of pesticides and herbicides. 
Outdoor cultivation can also result in soil erosion from tree clearing and the 
killing of wildlife, including endangered species. The vast majority of 
marijuana production occurs out-of-doors on remote public and tribal lands, 
with the result that the activities are largely unseen and, therefore, unregulated.5 
 
 3.  Katherine Curl Reitz, An Environmental Argument for a Consistent Federal Policy on 
Marijuana, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 1085, 1094 n.59 (2015) (“One study estimates that retail expenditures on 
illicit marijuana in 2010 were around $41 billion per year in the United States, although the authors state 
that a ‘plausible’ range is anything between $30 and $60 billion per year.”). 
 4.  Robert A. Mikos, Marijuana Localism, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 719, 736 (2015) (over 80 
percent of the American public supports legalization of marijuana for medical purposes). 
 5.  See, e.g., Hunter E. Starr, Comment, The Carrot and the Stick: Tailoring California’s 
Unlawful Marijuana Cultivation Statute to Address California’s Problems, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 
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Even though these outdoor operations are trespassing on public lands, 
their remoteness, the impenetrable nature of the terrain in which they occur, 
and the vastness of the area in which they take place make it close to 
impossible for underfunded federal land managers to close them down. They 
threaten to undo hard-won environmental victories protecting old-growth trees, 
watersheds, and endangered species as well as disrupt state-managed water 
allocation systems. By destroying tree cover, they also undermine efforts to 
reduce climate change. The challenge is how to end these highly profitable, 
illegal operations or subject them to environmental regulations. 
Complicating the situation is the odd federalism problem surrounding 
marijuana regulation, as its use for medical and increasingly for recreational 
purposes is outlawed at the federal level, but allowed in many states.6 Potential 
federal enforcement against possessing or distributing marijuana inhibits state 
regulation of the drug lest it be perceived as engaging in or facilitating a 
federally banned activity7 and causes all kinds of harm to marijuana users and 
members of the industry.8 Doctor Sharon Levy attributes the adverse 
environmental effects of marijuana cultivation to the continuing possibility of 
federal enforcement, which has discouraged state regulation9 and has had an 
inflationary effect on marijuana prices, increasing the illegal growers’ profit 
margin and the financial attractiveness of their operations to them.10 
Assuming it is highly unlikely that Congress will delist marijuana from 
Schedule I of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA)11 or that an Administration 
 
1069, 1092 (2013) (“In 2009, ‘California produced more outdoor-grown marijuana . . . than Mexico,’ 
most of it grown on public lands.”). 
 6.  Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States’ 
Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1481 (2009) (“Though Congress 
has banned marijuana outright through legislation that has survived constitutional scrutiny, state laws 
legalizing medical use of marijuana not only remain in effect, they now constitute the de facto governing 
law in thirteen states.”). 
 7.  Ernest A. Young, Modern-Day Nullification: Marijuana and the Persistence of Federalism in 
an Age of Overlapping Regulatory Jurisdiction, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769, 783 (2015) (“Colorado 
has done more than decline to regulate marijuana; rather, it has put in place a state regulatory regime 
that arguably supports and encourages a line of business that still violates federal law.”). 
 8.  See infra Part III.A. 
 9.  See Jennifer K. Carah et al., High Time for Conservation: Adding the Environment to the 
Debate on Marijuana Liberalization, 65 BIOSCIENCE, 822, 826 (2015), https://bioscience.ox-
fordjournals.org/content/65/8/822 (“[I]n Mendocino County, the local authority’s attempts to regulate 
medical markets have come into direct conflict with federal authorities, causing local officials to cease 
regulating the medical market (Mozingo 2013). This conflict also encourages secrecy and invisibility 
among producers for both the semi-legal medical and black markets, leading to lower levels of voluntary 
compliance with existing environmental regulation.”). 
 10.  See Levy, supra note 2, at 270 (“Federal prohibition creates the problem. ‘The root cause of 
environmental damage on public lands,’ says Tony Silvaggio, an environmental sociologist at the 
Humboldt Institute for Interdisciplinary Marijuana Research, ‘is the failed federal policy of marijuana 
prohibition. Prohibition inflates the price and makes it profitable to grow weed anywhere.’”). 
 11.  Mikos, supra note 6, at 1434: (“The federal government has steadfastly refused to expand 
legal access to marijuana. Congress has rejected proposals to reschedule the drug or to suspend 
enforcement of the CSA against people who may use marijuana under state law. Likewise, the federal 
Drug Enforcement Agency [] has denied petitions to reschedule the drug administratively.”); see Erwin 
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will decriminalize it,12 and that more states will authorize its use, the demand 
for the drug will continue to grow, regardless of the environmental harms its 
production generates.13 Scholars have proposed various ways short of delisting 
the drug, many of which this Article discusses in detail, to solve the federalism 
problem: for example, continuing the federal policy of tolerating violations of 
the federal ban; allowing states to share marijuana enforcement with the federal 
government14 or receive waivers15 from or opt out of federal enforcement 
under the CSA;16 or nullifying application of the CSA to the states.17 However, 
none of these ways by themselves assures that the illegal cultivation of 
marijuana will end as long as there is a market for the drug in the states that 
have legalized marijuana use and its production is profitable for its cultivators, 
processors, and distributors. This Article, therefore, focuses on how to reduce 
the market for illegally grown marijuana by persuading consumers to select the 
legally produced drug. Of course, this solution depends on the government 
allowing states to regulate the possession, distribution, and use of marijuana so 
there is a legal product for consumers to buy, bringing one back to square one 
and the federal ban. 
To tell this story, the Article begins by presenting background information 
on the marijuana industry, its expansion, where and how the crop is produced, 
and the environmental impacts of illegal marijuana farming. This discussion 
 
Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 62 UCLA L. REV. 74, 113 
(2015) (“Several federal marijuana-related bills have been introduced in Congress in recent years, but 
none has gained much traction.”); Reitz, supra note 3, at 1108 (“Marijuana could be delisted either by an 
act of Congress or by the Attorney General’s finding that marijuana ‘does not meet the requirements for 
inclusion in any schedule.’”).  
 12.  Reitz, supra note 3, at 1108 (“Attorney General Eric Holder stated on April 4, 2014 that the 
administration would not move to delist marijuana unless it had the support of Congress.”). 
“Decriminalization entails sharply reducing to the equivalent of a traffic offense or completely 
eliminating criminal penalties for the possession and use of small amounts of the drug.” Steven B. Duke, 
The Future of Marijuana in the United States, 91 OR. L. REV. 1301, 1316 (2013). In Europe most 
“countries have decriminalized marijuana, instead of legalizing it. As a result, the possession of a small 
amount of marijuana for personal use is only subject to a civil penalty, such as a fine.” Melanie Reid, 
The Quagmire that Nobody in the Federal Government Wants to Talk About: Marijuana, 44 N.M. L. 
REV. 169, 199 (2014). 
 13.  Reitz, supra note 3, at 1112 (“Legalizing marijuana will bring rogue growers out of the 
shadows, decreasing the number of growers that use stream and groundwater illegally and contaminate 
water sources with toxic chemicals.”). 
 14.   See, e.g., Chemerinsky et al., supra note 11, at 80 (proposing a shared federal-state regulation 
of marijuana). 
 15.  See, e.g., id. at 115 (“Under a permissive federalism approach, Congress could allow an 
administrative agency to grant state-level temporary, revocable waivers of the CSA marijuana 
provisions based on specified criteria. During the period of the waiver, participating states could 
experiment with their own laws and regulations while the federal government agrees not to enforce 
federal law.”).  
 16.  For example, Kamin proposes that Congress amend the CSA to allow states to “opt out of its 
marijuana provisions” and authorize the Attorney General “to certify that a state is regulating marijuana 
in a manner consistent with federal priorities.” Sam Kamin, Cooperative Federalism and State 
Marijuana Regulation, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 1105, 1120–21 (2014). 
 17.  Young, supra note 7, at 772 (suggesting modern day nullification may be a winning strategy). 
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focuses on Northern California because that is where most of the illegal 
cultivation activity and environmental damage is occurring. Part II examines 
the evolving legal status of marijuana in this country. In doing so, it addresses 
the enforcement problems created by inadequate federal resources, physical 
challenges presented by the location of these illegal grow sites, and the 
divergent federal-state views on marijuana’s legality. Part III investigates the 
impact of criminalization on the state-authorized marijuana industry and 
individual consumers. Turning to possible solutions to the federalism conflict, 
Part IV evaluates the current federal approach of tolerating state regulation, as 
well as other approaches like state waivers or opt outs from federal 
enforcement, state nullification of the ban, and the cooperative-federalism 
model of modern alcohol regulation. This Part concludes that, while a 
cooperative-federalism approach has some political viability, its 
implementation will have minimal effect on the black market for illegally 
produced drugs. 
Therefore, Part V turns to potential government actions that might weaken 
and eventually dry up the market for illegally produced marijuana, including 
the federal government pursuing a policy of strict enforcement in states that 
have legalized marijuana. Part V also considers whether non-regulatory 
approaches, such as norm manipulation, market-based incentives or 
disincentives, eco-labeling and product certification, and public education 
about the environmental harms caused by these operations, might induce 
consumers to buy legal marijuana, lessening the demand for illegal marijuana 
and with it, the profits associated with its illegal production. Part V concludes 
that no single approach provides a way to destabilize and eventually dry up the 
black market in marijuana, as each has flaws. However, a policy of adaptive 
diversification18 would allow any combination of these approaches to be tried 
and fine-tuned to fit the characteristics of the particular drug market. But 
indirect approaches, in tandem or sequentially, can only succeed if there is a 
legal marijuana alternative for consumers to choose. Thus, the Article returns to 
the intractability of the federalism conflict, admitting that progress cannot be 
made until it is resolved. Nonetheless, the author hopes that the information and 
analyses presented in the Article may be useful when, as likely, the drug is 
eventually decriminalized in response to public and state demand. 
I.  A BILLION DOLLAR INDUSTRY THAT IS CAUSING AN ENVIRONMENTAL 
CATASTROPHE IN CALIFORNIA 
Marijuana is the most widely used illegal drug in the United States.19 A 
2012 study “estimated 18.9 million individuals in the United States (7.3% of 
 
 18.  See generally Charles F. Manski, Drug Control Policy in an Uncertain World, 91 OR. L. REV. 
997, 1005 (2013). 
 19.  Reitz, supra note 3, at 1090; see Reid, supra note 12, at 171 (“Forty years after the passage of 
the CSA, 30 million Americans reported using marijuana. Between 124 million and 300 million 
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the population) had used marijuana in the past month.”20 According to a 2010 
study, “the marijuana market in America is probably about $40 billion a year, 
with the potential to grow to $100 billion per year in the event of widespread 
legalization.”21 One marijuana plant produced out-of-doors yields seven ounces 
of marijuana.22 “Between 2001 and 2005, the cost of one gram of marijuana 
averaged approximately six dollars.”23 Multiplied by the thousands of plants 
that are produced on public lands, the yield from these crops is in excess of one 
million dollars.24 The epicenter of this billion-dollar industry is the remote 
Sierra Nevada Mountains in Northern California.25 
California produces 60 percent of the marijuana consumed in the United 
States.26 Assuming a $6600-per-kg price, wholesale marijuana sales in 
California alone “total approximately $16.7 billion ($11.2 billion if one 
assumes a lower price of $4400 per kg).”27 The estimated value of marijuana 
grown only in Mendocino County, the center of the epicenter, is between $1.5 
billion to $10.5 billion a year.28 These estimates may make marijuana “the 
largest cash crop in California, with the next largest commodity, milk and 
cream, securing $6.9 billion in wholesale sales.”29 
The environmental harms associated with this billion-dollar industry are 
substantial.30 This may be because of the physical needs of the crop, where the 
 
people—3 to 4 percent of the world’s population—have reported using marijuana every year, which 
makes marijuana the most widely used illegal drug on the planet.”). 
 20.  Reitz, supra note 3, at 1090. 
 21.  Reid, supra note 12, at 194–95 (noting in addition that “[t]he real beneficiaries of the medical 
marijuana movement are the doctors who hand out marijuana medical cards like candy and the business 
owners who avoid paying federal taxes and who follow little-to-no state regulations”). 
 22.  Hunter E. Starr, supra note 5, at 1093. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. at 1092 (“In 2009, ‘California produced more outdoor-grown marijuana . . . than Mexico,’ 
most of it grown on public land.”); see id. at 1098 (saying “California has been the site of rampant large-
scale marijuana cultivation that has led to public safety hazards, degradation of the environment, and 
large expenditures in public tax money to regulate unlawful cultivation.”); see also Nathaniel Popper, 
The First Big Company to Say It’s Serving the Legal Marijuana Trade? Microsoft., N.Y. TIMES. (June 
16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/17/business/dealbook/microsoft-following-the-clouds-to-
offer-marijuana-tracking-software.html (reporting that Matthew A. Karnes, the founder of Green Wave 
Advisors, a company providing data and analysis to the marijuana business, expects “legal marijuana 
sales to jump to $6.5 billion this year, from $4.8 billion last year,” which could climb to $25 billion by 
2020 now that California voters have authorized the use of recreational marijuana). 
 26.  Carah et al., supra note 9, at 825. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Reitz, supra note 3, at 1110. 
 29.  Carah et al., supra note 9, at 825; see Reitz, supra note 3, at 1110 (making a similar 
comparison to the state’s grape crop, which is valued at just $75.3 million). 
 30.  See Anne C. Mulkern, Pot Legalization Heads to Ballot, With Money for Environment, 
GREENWIRE (June 29, 2016) (reporting on a Nature Conservancy analysis estimating that it will cost 
$187 million per year to deal with the environmental impacts of growing pot in California, including 
approximately $100 million per year to repair damage already done to the state’s rivers and streams). An 
additional problem, unrelated to environmental harms, but nonetheless serious, is the violence that 
occurs around these sites. “Pot growers in the backwoods tend to be armed and hostile to anyone who 
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cultivation is occurring, or that it is happening beyond the reach of any 
applicable federal or state regulations.31 
Unfortunately, illegal growers often care little about the environmental 
impacts of their operations, and are more concerned with maximizing their 
profits and avoiding the authorities. To begin, illegal growers sometimes 
use heavy earthmoving equipment to clear-cut forest in order to plant their 
marijuana crop. To obtain water for their plants, these growers frequently 
divert water from creeks illegally and indiscriminately, tapping into streams 
that may be on someone else’s property or may be critical habitat for 
endangered fish. Because these illegal growers usually do not have an 
interest in maintaining the long-term quality of the land, it is not 
uncommon for them to sprinkle repellants such as rat poison at the base of 
their plants, which are then washed off with the rain into streams, killing 
fish and polluting water supplies. When they are done harvesting their crop 
and ready to move on, they regularly leave fertilizers and dangerous 
chemicals that leach into soil and nearby streams, killing wildlife and 
causing irreparable damage.32 
California, which was the first state to legalize medical marijuana, has 
suffered the most severe environmental consequences from the absence of 
regulation.33 Since the 1996 Compassionate Use Act, both legal and illegal 
cultivation of marijuana for medical purposes have grown substantially; in the 
 
stumbles across their crop.” Levy, supra note 2, at 266; see also Carah et al., supra note 9, at 826, Fig. 4 
(“[M]arijuana water demand (on a per-area basis) exceeds water yield by almost ten times.”). 
 31.  Carah et al., supra note 9, at 822–23 (noting, “[h]owever, [that] regulation designed to 
mitigate environmental harm is more difficult to implement for marijuana cultivation than for other 
agricultural activities because of its unique and evolving legal status”); see Eric Biber, How 
Certification Could Reduce the Environmental Impacts of Marijuana Farms, BERKELEY BLOG (Jan. 16, 
2013), http://blogs.berkeley.edu/2013/01/16/how-certification-could-reduce-the-environmental-impacts-
of-marijuana-farms. Additionally, enforcement of environmental regulations by any jurisdiction is often 
opposed by local communities, which see them as problematic for the businesses, making enforcement 
against these illegal operations more difficult in isolated rural areas. Id. 
 32.  Reitz, supra note 3, at 1094. 
 33.  Id. at 1110; see Starr, supra note 5, at 1089 (“Large-scale marijuana cultivation damages 
California’s environment and natural resources. In Yosemite National Park, for instance, where sixty 
rangers patrolled over one-thousand square miles as of 2009, ‘[c]ultivating marijuana . . . has noticeably 
affected the water quality, animal life, and health and safety of the public.’ In addition to the danger to 
wildlife and hikers, large-scale marijuana cultivation negatively affects California during drought years 
by diverting precious water resources.”); id. at 1090 (“Even on the federal level, agencies recognize the 
deleterious environmental effects of marijuana cultivation. The Office of National Drug Control Policy 
stated that ‘[o]utdoor marijuana cultivation . . . has negative environmental effects.’ The paper cited the 
same kinds of problems that have plagued Yosemite National Park: ‘chemical contamination and 
alteration of watersheds; diversion of natural water courses; elimination of native vegetation; wildfire 
hazards; poaching of wildlife; and disposal of garbage, non-biodegradable materials, and human waste.’ 
In California, the problem is so prevalent that the United States Forest Service has printed warnings in 
the Mendocino National Forest that instruct hikers and visitors on what to do if they stumble upon a 
marijuana grow operation.”) (quoting Marijuana Cultivation on U.S. Public Lands: Hearing Before the 
Senate Caucus on Int’l Narcotics Control, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Gil Kerlikowske, Dir., Off. 
of Nat’l Drug Control)). 
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last five years alone, “watersheds in northern California have seen increases in 
area under production ranging from 55% to over 100%.”34 
The availability of water, sun, and remote public lands explains the state’s 
popularity for illegal marijuana cultivation.35 Mendocino County holds the 
dubious title of being described as “‘the marijuana capital of the world’ due to 
its combination of rich soil, moderate temperature, and extensive forests that 
can be used for camouflage.”36 Local law enforcement in Mendocino County, 
which seized 540,000 plants in 2009, estimated that they obtained only 5-10 
percent of the illegally grown marijuana in the county.37 In 2009, more than 3.5 
million marijuana plants were removed from public lands in California; in 
2013, 1 million more plants were eradicated.38 
Illegal marijuana production in California mostly occurs in sensitive, 
biodiversity-rich watersheds, which provide habitat for several rare state- and 
federally listed species.39 The following description gives a sense of the 
environmental damage at one of these sites. 
On a steep south-facing slope, acres of land had been clear-cut and terraced 
to grow rows of pot plants. Four natural springs were dug up and tapped; 
the creeks running down the hillside were diverted to water the crop. 
Seventeen primitive dams and reservoirs, reinforced with downed branches, 
lined with tarps and capable of holding more than 15,000 gallons, captured 
all the water on the site. More than 4000 pounds of fertilizer was found 
amid the debris. The growers dumped heavy loads of fertilizer right into the 
cisterns that they had built before they used the water for irrigation. The 
nitrogen-laden water from grow sites like this one drains into nearby 
streams, where it can cause intense blooms of algae that suck the oxygen 
from the water, suffocating native fish and aquatic life.40 
Illegal marijuana cultivation’s environmental impacts can be 
“disproportionally large” considering the size of the area under production 
because marijuana is a “water-hungry crop” that is being grown in an area of 
limited water resources and sensitive ecosystems.41 Some state officials 
 
 34.  Carah et al., supra note 9, at 825. 
 35.  Levy, supra note 2, at 268 (“[I]llegal pot farms have popped up anywhere there is water, 
sunshine, and remote public land.”); id. at 269 (“Illegal grows have been found on public lands scattered 
through 20 states, but the problem is most intense in California and the West.”). 
 36.  Reitz, supra note 3, at 1110. 
 37.  Id.; see Levy, supra note 2, at 265 (“Illegal grows are widespread: an intensive effort by 
federal agents in 2011 eradicated 55 grow sites in and around Northern California’s Mendocino National 
Forest, some of them containing more than 20,000 plants. In the U.S. Forest Service [] Pacific 
Southwest Region, 222 grows were busted in 2012 and 329 in 2013.”).  
 38.  Levy, supra note 2, at 269. 
 39.  Carah et al., supra note 9, at 822; see id. at 823 (“[M]arijuana cultivation is typically irrigated 
with summer and fall surface water diversions directly from headwater streams and springs. These 
diversions are localized in smaller, sensitive watersheds that are hotspots of biodiversity—and 
particularly aquatic biodiversity.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 40.  Levy, supra note 2, at 266. 
 41.  Carah et al., supra note 9, at 822; see id. at 824 (even relatively small grow sites “can have a 
disproportionately large impact on water resources and flow”). 
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consider illegal marijuana farming the “number one threat” to salmon in 
Mendocino County because it depletes streams that function as habitat for the 
fish during dry periods.42 Surface water diversions associated with illegal 
marijuana cultivation reduce, and in some cases eliminate entirely, streams that 
already have low flows during California’s dry summer season, threatening 
“the survival of rare and endangered salmonids, amphibians, and other 
animals.”43 It is not uncommon to find that the demand for water for marijuana 
cultivation “exceed[s] minimum instream flows in the summer by more than a 
factor of 2.”44 
Illegal marijuana grow sites are particularly deadly to wildlife, including 
endangered species.45 “Pesticides, used heavily in black-market marijuana 
cultivation on public lands, make their way into terrestrial food chains, posing 
significant risks to mammalian and avian predators.”46 Over 80 percent of 
deceased endangered Pacific fishers that a team of state wildlife biologists 
recovered in Northern California and the southern Sierra Nevada were exposed 
to anticoagulant rodenticides, used to control wood rats.47 Rats and other 
rodents that are the target of these rodenticides may not die immediately and 
become prey for wild predators, like raptors or other scavengers.48 It is not hard 
 
 42.  Reitz, supra note 3, at 1110; see Levy, supra note 2, at 266 (quoting the deputy supervisor of 
the Six Rivers National Forest as saying “[t]he water the growers divert is lost to our watersheds, and 
that impacts sensitive species like coho salmon and lamprey.”); Carah et al., supra note 9, at 823 (“Both 
semi-legal and black-market marijuana plantations can be harmful to water resources and aquatic life. In 
the California north coast region, an estimated 22 liters (L) of water or more per plant per day are 
applied during the June–October outdoor growing season . . . if we assume a planting density of 130,000 
plants per km, water application rates would be approximately 430 million L per km2 of outdoor-grown 
marijuana per growing season. For comparison, wine grapes on the north coast are estimated to use a 
mean of 271 million L of water per km2 of vines per growing season (CDWR 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 
2005). Marijuana is therefore estimated to be almost two times more ‘thirsty’ than wine grapes, the other 
major irrigated crop in the region.”).  
 43.  Carah et al., supra note 9, at 823. 
 44.  Id. at 824. 
 45.  See Starr, supra note 5, at 1089–90: (“Large-scale marijuana cultivators harm wildlife 
indirectly through detriment to their habitat, and directly by killing animals, including endangered 
species, through the use of chemicals or by poaching. Marijuana cultivators use pesticides and 
herbicides to keep their marijuana plants healthy. Illegal marijuana cultivators will often use herbicides 
and fuel into the water supply pesticides that have been banned in California. Further, cultivators may 
use generators, which can leak fuel into the soil and the water supply. Some cultivators leave hazardous 
materials, such as sewage and trash. They create a danger of wildfire through the use of chemicals, 
generators, and cooking fires. Aside from the indirect effect on wildlife, cultivators may poach wildlife. 
In Yosemite, cultivators kill animals for a variety of purposes. They ‘hunt [] deer for meat, they kill [] 
bear to hang as a deterrent to other wildlife, and even poach []’ endangered species, such as the ring-tail 
cat, to keep ‘for a souvenir.’”).  
While it is clear that illegal marijuana cultivation can be “lethal” to wildlife, less clear may be its impact 
on people who consume it. “Marijuana smokers do not use filters, and many of them have no idea that 
the pot they are smoking is contaminated with powerful toxins.” Levy, supra note 2, at 271. 
 46.  Carah et al., supra note 9, at 824. 
 47.  Id. Brodifacoum is an anticoagulant rodenticide that impairs normal blood clotting. Levy, 
supra note 2, at 267. 
 48.  Levy, supra note 2, at 267 (“Raptors and other creatures that hunt rodents have been known 
to die from eating contaminated prey.”). 
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to correlate the fisher deaths with marijuana cultivation, as they all occurred in 
the spring, which is “primetime for marijuana seedling planting in California 
and likely the period of heaviest toxicant use to protect the young plants from 
rodent damage.”49 The fact that only “two remnant populations [of fishers] 
survive in California: one in the southern Sierra Nevada and the other in the 
mountains of the far northwestern corner of the state,” underscores the tragedy 
of what is happening to the species.50 Levy considers fishers “the canary in the 
coal mine, a warning that there’s a major problem in the woods.”51 
Illegal marijuana cultivators often camp out on public lands for “months at 
a time and poach wildlife for sport and sustenance.”52 Associated cultivation 
activities, like terracing land, constructing roads, and clearing forest, destroy 
native vegetation that otherwise would provide habitat for many species of 
wildlife.53 These activities also increase erosion, which deposits fine sediments 
into streams, in turn, smothering salmon spawning and nursery habitats, 
including the federally endangered Coho salmon.54 “Nonbiodegradable trash 
and human excrement are commonly dumped around black-market marijuana 
cultivation sites,” as are pesticides, herbicides, fertilizers, and fuel; these 
pollutants can enter surface water and contaminate entire watersheds.55 Even 
when enforcement actions occur at these sites, there are insufficient resources 
to clean and remediate them.56 Effectively “[a]ddressing” the environmental 
harms from the illegal cultivation on public lands “requires a commitment to 
both addressing illegal production explicitly and remediating the environmental 
impacts from illegal production.”57 
 
 49.  Id.; see id. at 268 (saying “[i]n a recent study, Thompson [a U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
research ecologist] found that female fishers’ survival rates were related to the number of marijuana 
grows in the animals’ home range: the more grow sites that a fisher encountered, the shorter her life 
span”). 
 50.  Id. at 267. Levy describes the fisher as “[a]n elegant, house-cat-size member of the weasel 
family” that is a “rare predator” and “a candidate for listing under the federal and California Endangered 
Species Acts.” Id. at 266; see Carah et al., supra note 9, at 824 (“The use of these pesticides is a 
significant threat to fishers, which are already rare and are candidates for listing under the Federal 
Endangered Species Act.”). 
 51.  Levy, supra note 2, at 268 (quoting Craig Thompson, a U.S. Forest Service research 
ecologist). 
 52.  Carah et al., supra note 9, at 824. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. at 824–25. 
 56.  Id. at 827; see Reitz, supra note 3, at 1111 (“Water regulators have started a pilot project in 
Northern California where the California Department of Fish and Wildlife and the State Water 
Resources Control Board have teamed up to form the Watershed Enforcement Team []. The goal is for 
officials to get people in compliance with existing state environmental laws.”). 
 57.  Carah et al., supra note 9, at 825; see id. at 823 (“(a) [T]he environmental harm caused by 
marijuana cultivation in both the semi-legal and black-market context is significant and merits a direct 
policy response, (b) current approaches to and funding for governing the environmental effects are 
inadequate, and (c) neglecting discussion of the environmental impacts of cultivation when shaping 
future marijuana-use and -possession policies represents a missed opportunity to reduce, regulate, and 
mitigate environmental harm”). 
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While shifting marijuana cultivation indoors would eliminate many of the 
problems associated with these illegal grow sites, it would be trading one set of 
problems for another, given the high energy needs of indoor cultivation and the 
resulting large carbon footprint.58 Based on an assumption that one-third of the 
marijuana produced in this country is grown indoors, homegrown marijuana 
consumes approximately 1 percent of the country’s electricity consumption.59 
“In California—the largest producer of marijuana among the states—indoor 
cultivation is responsible for around 3% of all electricity use, or 9% of 
household use.”60 One marijuana joint produced by indoor cultivation 
“represents 1.5 kg (3 pounds) of [carbon dioxide] emissions.”61 This makes 
shifting marijuana cultivation outdoors a quintessential Hobson’s choice 
between dramatically reducing the amount of energy used in growing 
marijuana indoors and the industry’s carbon footprint,62 and the previously 
discussed substantial environmental impacts associated with illegal outdoor 
marijuana cultivation. Additionally, homegrown marijuana, like its outdoor 
cousin, uses pesticides, is a source of mold,63 and creates its own security 
concerns, such as the theft of electricity to sustain these operations and the 
resultant possibility of fires.64 Like the outdoor production of marijuana, 
homegrown marijuana also allows for diversion of the drug to illegal markets 
 
 58.  Reid, supra note 12, at 181: (“[A]n increase in indoor-cultivation of marijuana could result in 
a higher carbon foot-print, and in a massive increase in energy use resulting in greenhouse-gas pollution: 
‘[I]ndoor cannabis production results in energy expenditures of [US] $6 billion each year—[six] times 
that of the entire U.S. pharmaceutical industry—with electricity use equivalent to that of [two] million 
average U.S. homes. This corresponds to 1% of national electricity consumption, or 2% of that in 
households. The yearly greenhouse-gas pollution (carbon dioxide) from the electricity plus associated 
transportation fuels equals that of [three] million cars. Energy costs constitute a quarter of wholesale 
value.’”); see Reitz, supra note 3, at 1100 (“According to estimates by the NPCC, one kilogram of 
marijuana produced indoors requires 4,000 to 6,000 KWH (kilowatt hours). In comparison, it takes only 
16 KWH to produce one kilogram of aluminum, which is typically considered to be an energy-intensive 
product. To put those numbers in more concrete terms, the energy required to grow four marijuana 
plants indoors is equivalent to the amount of energy used by 29 refrigerators.”). 
 59.  Reitz, supra note 3, at 1101. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. at 1101–02. 
 62.  Id. at 1102 (saying “one study estimated that the average carbon emissions for outdoor-
cultivated marijuana would be 150 kg [carbon dioxide] per kg of marijuana, or about 3% of that 
associated with indoor production”). 
 63.  Reid, supra note 12, at 182: (“Pesticides used in hydroponic grow-systems can be toxic to 
animals and pollute local rivers and streams. Because there is ‘significant use of water’ in indoor grow 
operations, it is not uncommon for water-main breaks to occur, and leaking water could seep into 
adjacent homes and businesses, causing mold to grow. As a byproduct of growing marijuana indoors, 
large amounts of mold can form in the residence, creating a hazard for current and future residents.”); 
see John Hudak, Colorado’s Rollout of Legal Marijuana Is Succeeding: A Report on the State’s 
Implementation of Legalization, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 649, 670 (2015).  
 64.  Reid, supra note 12, at 182 (noting that risks associated with homegrown marijuana include 
product safety, production quality, and environmental issues like black mold that can invade production 
spaces); see Hudak, supra note 63, at 670 (“Law enforcement also echoed concerns that crimes like 
burglary and larceny may affect homegrown operations and could create additional, localized crime 
problems.”). 
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and distribution across state lines.65 Illegal homegrown marijuana, just like 
illegally cultivated outdoor marijuana, drains customers and revenue from legal 
state retail markets.66 
Marijuana is a growth industry, most of which is sustained by illegally 
harvested crops on public lands. The industry has thrived in the confusion 
created by the drug’s strange legal status where is it criminalized at the federal 
level and legal in slightly more than half the states. The next Part describes this 
strange and strained situation. 
II.  THE STRANGE AND STRAINED LEGAL STATUS OF MARIJUANA IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
“Marijuana is the only substance, and its possession is the only activity, 
that is prohibited at the federal level while it is being taxed and regulated in the 
states.”67 Before the 2016 election, twenty-three states had legalized medical 
use of marijuana;68 after the election, three more states joined them, making 
medical use of marijuana legal in slightly more than half of the country’s 
states.69 Non-medical use of marijuana largely remains “strictly forbidden and 
usually (though not always) criminal . . . at the state level,”70 but even that is 
beginning to change, as some states are legalizing recreational use of the drug 
and/or are substituting civil penalties for criminal ones, as discussed in more 
detail below. At the federal level, there is no exception to the drug’s 
criminalization71—any use of the drug, its cultivation, possession, or sale, is a 
federal crime.72 Take medical marijuana, for example. Its state legalization and 
federal criminalization creates the federalism conflict underlying much of this 
Article. This situation is unique in that it is rare for a state to legalize an activity 
that is prohibited at the federal level.73 
 
 65.  Hudak, supra note 64, at 670. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Adler, supra note 1, at 1427. 
 68.  Alex Kreit, What Will Federal Marijuana Reform Look Like?, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 689, 
718 (2015); see Mikos, supra note 4, at 764 (2015) (“Twenty-three states have legalized marijuana for 
some purposes under state law. As of the November 2014 election, at least twenty-one of those states 
have also legalized some form of retail distribution of marijuana.”).  
 69.  Adam Bates, Drug Prohibition was a Loser Last Night, Cato at Liberty (Nov. 9, 2016, 11:38 
AM), https://www.cato.org/blog/drug-prohibition-was-loser-last-night?gclid=CjwKEAiAvs7CBRC24r 
ao6bGCoiASJABaCt5DhxhhdJ80sDDnulDrH5fC66hYMNcGWLxGEXMHQV5Q-RoCVgDw_wcB. 
 70.  Mikos, supra note 6, at 1427. 
 71.  Chemerinsky et al., supra note 11, at 109–10. 
 72.  Adler, supra note 1, at 506. 
 73.  Kamin, supra note 16, at 1005. See Adler, supra note 1, at 508: (“It is not often that states 
affirmatively seek to legalize conduct prohibited by federal law. Rarer still do states seek to expressly 
authorize and affirmatively regulate commercial activities that remain subject to federal prohibition. Yet 
that is precisely what is occurring with marijuana. Indeed, what the federal government seeks to 
prohibit, many states hope to tax.”). 
Babcock Final Word Doc Headers Whited Out (Do Not Delete)3/14/2017  1:00 PM 
2016] ILLEGAL MARIJUANA CULTIVATION 735 
A.  Federal Criminalization 
In 1937, Congress enacted the Marijuana Tax Act making possession of 
the drug illegal. “The passage of the [CSA] in 1970 cemented and systematized 
this prohibition.”74 The federal ban on marijuana remains “very much the law 
of the land,” despite repeated attempts to alter the drug’s criminal status under 
the CSA.75 
Marijuana is classified under the CSA as a Schedule I drug, as are LSD 
and heroin.76 The CSA makes it a serious felony to manufacture, possess, or 
sell marijuana, and doctors are prohibited from prescribing it.77 Doing any of 
these things in a state that has legalized marijuana is a federal crime and is 
subject to serious sanctions.78 The federal marijuana ban has withstood 
Commerce Clause challenges as well as claims that it exceeds a “fundamental 
right to access pain relief” by those who use it for medical purposes.79 While it 
is possible for the president to administratively reclassify marijuana under the 
CSA,80 and indeed, in 2011 the governors of Rhode Island and Washington 
called for the President to do exactly that,81 international treaties prevent the 
 
 74.  Kamin, supra note 16, at 1106; see Chemerinsky et al., supra note 11, at 82 (“In 1937 the 
federal government set out to regulate the drug for the first time. That year, Congress passed the 
Marijuana Tax Act, which led to dropping marijuana from the Federal Pharmacopoeia, the list of 
permissible medicines approved by the federal government. Although the American Medical 
Association [] opposed the reclassification of marijuana, those trumpeting its association with crime and 
disfavored minority groups ultimately prevailed.”). 
 75.  Id.; see id. (“The Supreme Court has upheld Congress’s authority to regulate marijuana—
even marijuana grown at home for the personal use of the grower—under its Commerce Clause 
power.”); see also Duke, supra note 12, at 1305 (“The Supreme Court held (correctly) in Gonzales v. 
Raich, [545 U.S. 1, 29–33 (2005)] that federal prosecution of persons who complied with state medical 
marijuana laws is lawful under the Commerce and Supremacy Clauses.”); Chemerinsky et al., supra 
note 11, at 83 (stating that in Americans for Safe Access v. Drug Enforcement Administration, 706 F.3d 
438, 440–41 (D.C. Cir. 2013), the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia “declined to characterize as 
arbitrary and capricious the Drug Enforcement Administration[]’s refusal to reschedule marijuana”).  
 76.  Chemerinsky et al., supra note 11, at 82–83; see Young, supra note 7, at 774 (marijuana is “a 
Schedule 1 drug under the CSA based on a finding that it has no accepted medical use and a high 
potential for abuse”); Chemerinsky et al., supra note 11, at 82 (a Schedule 1 drug is defined “as a drug 
with a high likelihood of addiction and no safe dose”). 
 77.  Kamin, supra note 16, at 1106. See also Chemerinsky et al., supra note 11, at 83 (“Under the 
CSA, the manufacture, distribution, and possession of Schedule 1 narcotics is prohibited and 
punishments can extend to life in prison for large volume manufacturers and dealers.”). Only two 
limited exceptions to the federal ban on marijuana have been made. The first, a compassionate use 
program created under President Carter, is superficially analogous to extant state medical use programs; 
it allows patients to use marijuana legally for therapeutic purposes. The marijuana for the program is 
supplied by a federally approved grow-site at the University of Mississippi (the only federally approved 
grow-site in the United States). However, the program stopped accepting new applications in 1992, and 
only eight (yes, eight) patients currently receive marijuana through it. Over its entire history, only thirty-
six patients have been enrolled. The second and only other way to obtain marijuana legally under federal 
law is by participating in an FDA-approved research study.  
Mikos, supra note 6, at 1433 (2009).  
 78.  Mikos, supra note 6, at 1435. 
 79.  Young, supra note 7, at 774. 
 80.  Kreit, supra note 68, at 696. 
 81.  Id. at 697. 
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DEA from doing this.82 Even if the agency could do this, according to 
Professor Alex Kreit, the DEA would not move the drug lower than Schedule 
II.83 
Sanctions for violating the federal ban are harsh. Even minor drug 
convictions can cause severe “collateral sanctions,” such as loss of student 
financial aid and public assistance.84 Possession of marijuana is a 
misdemeanor, punishable by up to one year in prison and a minimum $1000 
fine plus costs.85 It is a felony to manufacture, distribute, or possess any 
amount of marijuana with intent to distribute, earning the violator a maximum 
five-year jail term and a maximum fine of $250,000 for individuals and $1 
million for organizations.86 If the defendant has a prior federal drug conviction, 
the maximum sanction is doubled.87 Distribution of a small amount of 
marijuana for free constitutes simple possession, a misdemeanor, but only if the 
“social sharing” is among friends.88 The CSA also allows the federal 
government to seize assets used in violation of the Act, including real property 
and any structures on seized land.89 Given the vulnerability of marijuana 
business assets to seizure, it easy to see why banks would be wary of using 
them as collateral for any loans.90 
The federal government has largely ceded enforcement of the CSA to the 
states because there are far fewer federal enforcement officers than state ones.91 
 
 82.  Id.; see Duke, supra note 12, at 1302 (“Repeal at the federal level may be constrained by 
international treaties, which permit decriminalization but may not allow outright legalization.”); Reid, 
supra note 12, at 186 (“In 1961, 170 countries, including the United States, signed the United Nations 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. This convention required signatory nations to make the 
production, trade, and possession of marijuana for non-medical reasons a punishable offense.”); id. 
(“The United States is also a participant in the United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances 
of 1971 and the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic of 1988. According to these 
conventions, possession of any prohibited substance for non-medicinal or nonscientific use was to be 
made a criminal offense under domestic law.”); Id. at 187 (“If the United States chooses to legalize 
marijuana production and use, it runs the risk of appearing hypocritical in the face of it international 
treaty obligations.”).  
 83.  Kreit, supra note 68, at 697; see Reid, supra note 12, at 192 (“In order to place a drug on 
Schedule II, the FDA would have to determine the correct dosage for medicinal use.”). 
 84.  Mikos, supra note 6, at 1435 (“What is more, even minor drug convictions can trigger harsh 
collateral sanctions under both state and federal law, including loss of student financial aid and public 
assistance.”). 
 85.  Id. (“Offenders with prior drug records, however, face tougher sanctions: one prior conviction 
triggers mandatory prison time of fifteen days, raises the minimum fine to $2,500, and extends the 
maximum prison term to two years; a second conviction triggers a minimum term of ninety days 
imprisonment, a minimum fine of $5,000 plus costs, and a maximum prison term of three years.”). 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. at 1436 n.61. 
 89.  Kamin, supra note 16, at 1108, n.15. 
 90.  Chemerinsky et al., supra note 11, at 93. 
 91.  Adler, supra note 1, at 507 (“There are approximately four times as many state and local 
enforcement officers within the states of Washington and Colorado as there are Drug Enforcement 
Administration agents across the globe.”); see id. at 506 (citing Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), as 
affirming federal authority to ban marijuana possession and distribution, while noting that “the ability of 
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Federal officials only handle 1 percent of about 800,000 marijuana cases 
processed annually, and those numbers are going down.92 Since after Printz v. 
United States,93 the federal government cannot compel the states to help 
enforce the CSA, it “must wage its war on drugs without many foot soldiers.”94 
The weak enforcement posture of the federal government may explain the 
government’s tolerance of state legalization and why President Obama has 
instructed his Departments of Justice and Treasury “to accommodate these state 
departures from federal norms.”95 
In recognition of the disparity in enforcement resources, the Department 
of Justice has slowly pulled back on federal enforcement in a series of Attorney 
General Memoranda. In 2009, the so-called Ogden Memorandum, named after 
Deputy Attorney General David Ogden, announced to U.S. attorneys that 
“prosecuting seriously ill people who used state-legal medical marijuana was 
‘unlikely to be an efficient use of limited federal resources.’”96 In 2011, Deputy 
Attorney General James Cole issued a new memorandum, clarifying that 
“‘[t]he Ogden Memorandum was never intended to shield’ profitable or ‘large-
scale’ cultivation of marijuana even where permitted under a state’s medical 
marijuana laws.”97 In 2013, Deputy Attorney Cole issued a second 
memorandum, addressing the legalization of marijuana in Colorado and 
Washington, in which federal prosecutors were advised “not [to] consider the 
size or commercial nature of a marijuana operation alone,” but also “the 
existence of a strong and effective state regulatory system, and an operation’s 
compliance with such a system.”98 
 
the federal government to enforce this policy is largely dependent upon state cooperation”); 
Chemerinsky et al., supra note 11, at 84 (“Since the CSA’s implementation more than forty years ago, 
nearly all marijuana enforcement in the United States has taken place at the state level. For example, of 
the nearly 900,000 marijuana arrests in 2012, arrests made at the state and local level dwarfed those 
made by federal officials by a ratio of 109 to 1.”); Carah et al., supra note 9, at 826 (“The small number 
of state agents currently available to regulate this industry and others—and to enforce environmental 
laws—is not sufficient to adequately address the large number of marijuana cultivation sites.”). 
 92.  Mikos, supra note 6, at 1424; see Reid, supra note 12, at 178 (“[M]arijuana related 
prosecutions at the federal level have significantly decreased.”). 
 93.  Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 94.  Adler, supra note 1, at 507. 
 95.  Young, supra note 7, at 771; see id. at 774 (“The federal government has too few law 
enforcement agents to handle the large number of potential targets. Simply put, the expected sanctions 
for using or supplying marijuana under federal law are too low, standing alone, to deter many 
prospective marijuana users or suppliers.”) (quoting Mikos, supra note 6, at 1463). 
 96.  William Baude, State Regulation and the Necessary and Proper Clause, 65 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 513, 516 (2015).  
 97.  Id. at 516. 
 98.  Id.; see Kamin, supra note 16, at 1111 (“Deputy Cole announced that the Department of 
Justice would not be moving to block the implementation of recreational marijuana regulation in 
Colorado and Washington. This second Cole memo noted the historical reality that nearly all marijuana 
enforcement is done at the local level. While the federal government continues to have strong policy 
concerns about marijuana—e.g., the sale to minors, the diversion of marijuana between states, and the 
involvement of organized crime—it has generally left the enforcement of those priorities to the states.”). 
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The second Cole Memorandum clarifies that the default option remains 
enforcement of the CSA for states that prefer that option or for those states that 
are unable to deal with federal marijuana concerns.  “But those states that wish 
to tax and regulate marijuana—either for medical or adult use—will be left to 
their own devices so long as they can demonstrate that their regulations are 
achieving the federal goals.”99 The second Cole Memorandum also directed 
federal prosecutors to pursue only those cases that will: 
prevent[] distribution of marijuana to minors; prevent[] revenue from the 
sale of marijuana from going to criminal enterprises, gangs, and cartels; 
prevent[] the diversion of marijuana from states where it is legal under state 
law in some form to other states; prevent[] state-authorized marijuana 
activity from being used as a cover or pretext for the trafficking of other 
illegal drugs or other illegal activity; prevent[] violence and the use of 
firearms in the cultivation and distribution of marijuana; prevent[] drugged 
driving and the exacerbation of other adverse public health consequences 
associated with marijuana use; prevent[] the growing of marijuana on 
public lands; and prevent[] marijuana possession or use on federal 
property.100 
However, if a state regulatory program is not sufficiently “robust” to meet 
these criteria, then the federal government may challenge that program and/or 
bring its own enforcement action.101 The threat of federal intervention, should a 
state’s regulatory program fail, looms sufficiently large over the legal 
marijuana market in states like Colorado that it has encouraged members of that 
industry to push for and comply with state regulations.102 
Thus, under the current federal policy, “states are allowed to experiment 
with marijuana law reform through an act of prosecutorial grace”; meaning that  
because “federal prosecutors have chosen not to prosecute them.”103 Former 
Attorney General Eric Holder once said that “full legalization”—that is, 
legalization of not only medical marijuana, but also recreational marijuana—
“would cross a red line.”104 Moreover, federal enforcement policy is only a 
policy, and what appears to be lenient today may become less so under a new, 
 
 99.  Kamin, supra note 16, at 1112. 
 100.  Reid, supra note 12, at 179–80. 
 101.  Kamin, note 16, at 1112 (quoting JAMES M. COLE, DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, GUIDANCE 
REGARDING MARIJUANA ENFORCEMENT 3 (2013), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013-
829132756857467); see Hudak, supra note 63, at 653 (“For legalized marijuana [successful] 
implementation matters . . . [t]he federal government, in the context of Justice Department enforcement, 
will take a hands-off approach to the enforcement of the [CSA] if, and only if, states implement 
regulation[s] effectively and comprehensively.”). 
 102.  Hudak, supra note 63, at 665 (“[T]he federal threat improved compliance, brought industry to 
the table, motivated firms to play by the rules, induced the industry to see the need for regulation, and 
facilitated communication between industry and regulators.”). 
 103.  Kamin, supra note 16, at 1121. 
 104.  Id. at 1110; but see Duke, supra note 12, at 1306 (“A decision voiding state permissiveness 
would be patently unsound and unenforceable. The Court that decided Bush v. Gore, [531 U.S. 98 
(2000)] could render such a decision, but it would deserve no respect.”) (emphasis added). 
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or even the same, Administration.105 And experimentation that allows states to 
tax and regulate marijuana under the second Cole Memorandum at the state 
level seems unlikely to occur as long as the drug is illegal at the federal level 
regardless of a policy of non-prosecution.106 The very fact that the threat of 
federal enforcement remains can “cripple” implementation of those state laws 
and subject both “practitioners and consumers to the threat of significant prison 
terms,”107 as discussed later in this Article.108 
The federal government is not completely out of the marijuana 
enforcement business. However, its limited enforcement resources have led it 
to shift its resources from criminally prosecuting medical-marijuana users to 
doctors who recommend the use of the drug and growers who supply it.109 
Focusing on suppliers like large marijuana cooperatives, which can service 
thousands of customers, can have a large impact and trigger much stiffer 
penalties than for simple possession, the charge most individual drug users are 
subjected to.110 Despite not prioritizing marijuana enforcement in states that 
have legalized marijuana, the federal government spent $483 million dollars 
interfering with those laws between 1996 and 2012, by conducting over 500 
raids and prosecuting dozens of people operating in compliance with them.111 
In California, as a way to “disrupt essential components of the state marijuana 
program,” the DEA has raided almost 200 medical marijuana cooperatives, as 
well as their landlords and the doctors who prescribe the drug to patients.112 
The government’s “hard line” on medical marijuana may be “rooted” in the 
sincere belief that the benefits of medical marijuana have not yet been 
demonstrated, that “it harms users and third parties, that legalizing marijuana 
for medical purposes suggests the drug is safe for other uses as well, and that 
 
 105.  Baude, supra note 96, at 517 (“[F]ederal enforcement policy can change. The memoranda 
themselves illustrate this, as each takes a different position from the previous one on how to assess 
marijuana producers who comply with state law.”); see Kamin, supra note 16, at 1121 (saying that the 
decision not to prosecute “can be undone by yet another memo”). 
 106.  Kamin, supra note 16, at 1120 (“Deputy Attorney General Cole stated that federal policy is to 
let states achieve federal goals through the taxing and regulation of marijuana rather than state-level 
prohibition, but the criminality of marijuana at the federal level makes such experimentation essentially 
impossible in practice.”). 
 107.  Id. at 1108; see Duke, supra note 12, at 1306 (“[A]n ardent, widespread, and protracted 
federal campaign of prosecuting marijuana users, growers, and distributors would have a powerful 
chilling effect on all who use or contemplate using or distributing marijuana, however clearly they might 
comply with state law,” and could “virtually” nullify those laws if such a campaign were to focus on 
those who are in compliance with state laws as opposed to those who are not.). 
 108.  See infra Part III. 
 109.  Mikos, supra note 6, at 1465. See id. at 1467 (“[T]he [Drug Enforcement Administration] has 
raided nearly 200 medical marijuana cooperatives in California alone since 1996. It has also commenced 
forfeiture proceedings against landlords who knowingly rent property to marijuana growers.”). 
 110.  Id. at 1467. 
 111.  Kreit, supra note 68, at 690. 
 112.  Mikos, supra note 6, at 1443. 
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marijuana grown for medical purposes would invariably be diverted onto the 
black market.”113 
One problem hampering even this aspect of the federal government’s 
marijuana enforcement program is that the drug is so easy to produce.114 
Marijuana plants can be grown “virtually anywhere, indoors and out, requiring 
little horticultural expertise or significant financial investment.”115 A new 
marijuana dispensary can take the place of any one that is shut down and 
smaller growers can satisfy the demand for marijuana created by any large 
grower the federal government has closed.116 “Shut them all down—an 
expensive and extremely unlikely endeavor—and many marijuana users would 
simply grow the stuff themselves.”117 High demand for the drug may result in 
federal eradication campaigns pushing marijuana production into “smaller 
operations that are harder to detect, more costly to prosecute given their sheer 
numbers, and subject to lower sanctions under the CSA,”118 and the frustration 
of states like Colorado that are trying to monitor the supply of marijuana.119 
B.  State Legalization 
Until the 1910s, when a number of states criminalized growing and 
consuming marijuana, the drug had been legal.120 For a variety of reasons—the 
pointlessness of prohibiting something that was widely available, the racially 
disparate impact of marijuana laws, or the resources enforcement of marijuana 
laws expended—states started to reconsider their marijuana laws.121 Starting in 
1996 with the passage of California’s Compassionate Use Act, states began 
 
 113.  Id. at 1434; see Reid, supra note 12, at 193 (“Cannabis or marijuana cannot be defined 
chemically, nor can it be easily standardized. . . . [S]moking as a dosage form to deliver marijuana to the 
human body is unsuitable for medical treatment due to: (1) lack of standardization of the marijuana, (2) 
lack of knowledge of the amounts of each constituent available, (3) lack of knowledge of the activity of 
the chemicals while burning, (4) amount of product ingested being dependent on the individual’s 
smoking technique, and (5) possible carcinogenic effect of smoking. There are no drugs which are 
delivered by smoking which are medically used in the United States.”) (quoting Marijuana Scheduling 
Petition: Denial of Petition, 54 Fed. Reg. 53,767, 53,773 (Dec. 29, 1989)). 
 114.  Mikos, supra note 6, at 1467 (“One of the main reasons these efforts have failed is because 
there are no substantial barriers to entry in the marijuana market. Marijuana can be produced in almost 
any climate. Unlike other drugs, no special skills, technologies, or special inputs are needed to cultivate 
the plant (or so I’m told). Indeed, one can easily obtain advice on how to grow the drug at bookstores 
and via various websites.”).  
 115.  Duke, supra note 12, at 1315. 
 116.  Mikos, supra note 6, at 1467–68. Government failure can also be costly, create regulatory and 
market uncertainty, lower the morale of government employees and trust in government, and even cause 
both public and political embarrassment. Hudak, supra note 63, at 652. 
 117.  Mikos, supra note 6, at 1468. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. (“[S]uch a campaign may have an unintended and deleterious consequence: to the extent 
users turn to smaller (and more numerous) suppliers or simply grow the drug themselves, the federal 
campaign would frustrate state efforts to supervise the supply of marijuana.”). 
 120.  Chemerinsky et al., supra note 11, at 81. The authors attribute the move to regulate marijuana 
to racism and xenophobia. Id.  
 121.  Id. at 84–85. 
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authorizing its use, first for medical purposes and more recently for 
recreation.122 Today, over half the states and the District of Columbia allow for 
the medical use of marijuana, and some states and the District of Columbia 
have legalized the drug entirely.123  
In 2012, Colorado and Washington legalized recreational use of 
marijuana, followed two years later by Alaska, Oregon, and the District of 
Columbia.124 California, Massachusetts, and Nevada legalized recreational 
marijuana in the 2016 election; only Arizona rejected it by a small margin.125 
Prior to the most recent election, “37 states and the District of Columbia ha[d] 
liberalized their marijuana laws in some way.”126 Even before the Colorado 
and Washington ballot initiatives legalizing recreational marijuana, many states 
had laws punishing the use or possession of marijuana much more leniently 
than the CSA; some punished possession of less than an ounce of marijuana 
only by a fine.127 By removing criminal sanctions for possession of marijuana, 
these states were allowing individuals to engage in conduct criminalized under 
federal law.128 
“As a practical matter, by simply legalizing a given behavior, the states 
can remove or at least diminish the most significant barriers inhibiting that 
behavior, including state legal sanctions . . . and the personal, moral, and social 
disapproval of the behavior as well.”129 State legalization of medical marijuana 
has created a more tolerant personal and social atmosphere about the drug’s 
use.130 Additionally, state medical marijuana laws have more influence over 
private behavior than the federal ban, in part, because states have more 
influence over “the non-legal forces that shape behavior, including personal 
beliefs, moral obligations, and social norms.”131 By not punishing marijuana 
 
 122.  Kamin, supra note 16, at 1107 (“States are authorizing under their own laws the possession, 
manufacture, and distribution of the drug—either for medical patients or for all adults—while the 
federal government continues to treat marijuana as a prohibited substance.”). 
 123.  Kreit, supra note 68, at 718; Bates, supra note 69. See Mikos, supra note 4, at 764 (Prior to 
the 2016 election, “twenty-three states ha[d] legalized marijuana for some purposes under state law. As 
of the November 2014 election, at least twenty-one of those states ha[d] also legalized some form of 
retail distribution of marijuana.”).  
 124.  Reitz, supra note 3, at 1086–87. 
 125.  Bates, supra note 69. 
 126.  Reitz, supra note 3, at 1086–87. 
 127.  Chemerinsky et al., supra note 11, at 111. 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Mikos, supra note 6, at 1424 (“[S]tates also have comparatively strong sway over the private 
(i.e., non-legal) forces that shape our actions, such as our personal beliefs about behavior and our social 
norms. Simply by allowing their residents to use marijuana for medical purposes, the states have 
arguably fostered more tolerant attitudes toward the practice, making it seem more compassionate, less 
dangerous, and less wicked, thereby removing or softening the personal and societal reproach that once 
suppressed medical use of the drug. The expressive power of permissive state legislation—largely 
ignored by the academy—cannot easily be undone or countered by Congress. As a result, the states may 
possess even more de facto power vis-à-vis Congress than is commonly perceived.”). 
 130.  Id. at 1424–25. 
 131.  Id. at 1426. See infra Part V.A.2. 
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use, particularly after having banned its use for so many years, “the states are 
arguably suggesting that marijuana use is safe, beneficial, and not wicked.”132 
The result is that “medical marijuana use has survived and indeed thrived in the 
shadow of the federal ban”133—it is “easier to find a head shop than a coffee 
shop” in Boulder, Colorado.134 On the other hand, “[a]s long as the federal ban 
persists, so the argument goes, social norms condemning drug use and criminal 
behavior will continue to suppress use of marijuana for medical purposes, even 
if the federal ban is not rigorously enforced.”135 
All indications are that the state “legalization train is not slowing 
down.”136 State legalization of marijuana has strong public support;137 even 
national public opinion is clearly moving toward legalization.138 “In 1969, only 
12% of Americans were in favor of legalizing the use of marijuana—but today, 
between 51% and 61% of Americans support its legalization.”139 The result is a 
rather strange federalism moment where states are legalizing and regulating 
behavior that is a federal crime, for which public support is diminishing.140 
States like Colorado that are licensing marijuana suppliers and medical users to 
distribute or use marijuana, are “literally, licensing a violation of the 
 
 132.  Mikos, supra note 6, at 1454. 
 133.  Id. at 1482. 
 134.  Young, supra note 7, at 774. 
 135.  Mikos, supra note 6, at 1443–44. 
 136.  Popper, supra note 25 (explaining Microsoft’s decision to provide software to states that have 
legalized medical or recreational marijuana use to track marijuana plants from “seed to sale”); see 
Chemerinsky et al., supra note 11, at 113 (“Given the significant limitations on the federal government’s 
ability to nullify state laws legalizing marijuana, and the increasing public support for liberalizing 
marijuana laws, the number of states doing away with their marijuana prohibitions is likely to only grow 
in the years to come.”); but see Mikos, supra note 4, at 720 (“But the states are now facing growing 
opposition from within their own borders. Citing concerns over marijuana’s perceived harms, many 
local communities in marijuana legalization states are seeking to reinstate marijuana prohibitions at the 
local level. Communities in at least twelve marijuana legalization states have already passed local bans 
on marijuana dispensaries. Even in Colorado, arguably the state with the most liberal marijuana policies, 
more than 150 municipalities have passed ordinances banning the commercial sale of marijuana.”); id. 
(“[C]ountless other communities that otherwise welcome or at least tolerate the marijuana industry are 
nonetheless attempting to regulate it, imposing their own idiosyncratic rules concerning the location, 
size, hours, signage, security, and goods sold and taxes paid by local vendors.”). 
 137.  Kreit, supra note 68, at 698 (“[P]olling indicates substantial support for deferring to states, 
even among legalization opponents.”). 
 138.  Hudak, supra note 63, at 653–54; but cf. Young, supra note 7, at 791 (“National public 
opinion on marijuana places the [CSA] in a kind of limbo. There is insufficient public demand for 
legalization to engender a strong political movement for repeal or amendment, but there is also 
insufficient support for prosecuting marijuana users to prompt federal authorities to allocate increased 
resources that might compensate for state noncooperation.”); see id. at 773 (pointing out that President 
Obama is “both sympathetic to legalization and fond of not enforcing federal laws with which it 
disagrees”).  
 139.  Reitz, supra note 3, at 1087; see Mikos, supra note 6, at 1477 (“[O]pinion polls consistently 
show more than 70 percent of the American public now approves of the use of marijuana for medical 
conditions.”). 
 140.  Mikos, supra note 6, at 1425 (“[F]or all practical purposes, [states have] already made 
medical marijuana de facto legal within their jurisdictions.”). 
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[CSA].”141 These states have not just declined to enforce federal law; they have 
constructed regulatory regimes that “arguably support[] and encourage[] a line 
of business that still violates federal law.”142 
The next Part discusses the problems the federal-state conflict over 
marijuana policy causes for all involved in the industry143 and some possible 
ways to resolve that conflict. 
III.  PROBLEMS CAUSED BY THE FEDERAL-STATE CONFLICT OVER            
MARIJUANA POLICY 
The status quo of state legalization and federal criminalization of 
marijuana is not good for anyone. What is happening in the states cannot help 
but undermine federal enforcement of the law and respect for the law in 
general.144 Criminalization of marijuana imposes “human costs on producers 
and consumers” of the drug and “gives states little incentive to behave well in 
setting up their own legal regime.”145 It has done little, if anything, to end the 
illegal cultivation of marijuana on public lands. On the other hand, 
decriminalizing marijuana would not only eliminate the negative effects of 
criminalization, but could also result in a safer drug, create tax revenues for the 
states, which could be used to defray the cost of regulation, and might lower the 
cost of the drug, making it less attractive to black-market suppliers. 
A.  The Costs of Criminalization 
The continuing possibility of federal enforcement hangs like a sword of 
Damocles over the heads of businesses that engage in the marijuana industry, 
as well as over individuals who use it for medical or recreational purposes, 
 
 141.  Young, supra note 7, at 786. 
 142.  Id. at 783; see id. at 786 (“Colorado has not simply decided not to prohibit marijuana use. 
Rather, it has established a regulatory regime predicated on the legality of some marijuana 
consumption—notwithstanding the continuing prohibition of marijuana cultivation, distribution, and 
consumption under federal law.”); id. at 787 (“Certainly proposals to have the state cultivate marijuana 
in order to safeguard its quality are preempted (and could well lead to actual federal prosecution of state 
officials).”). 
 143.  Popper, supra note 25 (commenting that this strange regulatory situation has given a 
somewhat “improvisational nature to the cannabis industry”). 
 144. Brannon P. Denning, Vertical Federalism, Horizontal Federalism, and Legal Obstacles to 
State Marijuana Legalization Efforts, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 567, 578 (2015) (“[S]tate legalization 
regimes permitting marijuana use for medical or recreational purposes present a substantial obstacle to 
the implementation of a federal law that (1) recognizes no medical use for marijuana and (2) seeks to 
eliminate the national market in marijuana by banning all production, possession, and transfer. Only the 
DOJ announced policy of forbearance keeps this conflict from coming to a head.”). 
 145.  Baude, supra note 96, at 516 (“The new marijuana federalism—a federalism accomplished 
through state legalization and federal nonenforcement—is problematic for those who support 
decentralization. First, the status quo imposes human costs on producers and consumers in the marijuana 
business. It might be good for those who opposed decentralization in the first place, but that is not the 
premise from which the relevant states or the executive branch appear to be proceeding. Second, the 
status quo gives states little incentive to behave well in setting up their own legal regime.”). 
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practitioners—like doctors—who prescribe it, and marijuana dispensaries who 
sell the drug.146  Even if federal drug laws are not enforced in states that have 
legalized marijuana, their existence creates “serious problems for banks, 
lawyers, and others who might otherwise want to work with the in-state 
marijuana industry.”147 Additionally, and not inconsequentially, the threat of 
federal enforcement undermines the ability of those states that have legalized 
the drug to establish a stable regulatory regime.148 
Because marijuana businesses are taking part in a criminal activity, they 
may have trouble entering into any contractual relationships,149 and cannot rely 
on any contracts they do conclude, including insurance contracts.150 They may 
also have problems getting legal help in understanding “the legal minefield 
created by complex state regulatory apparatuses.”151 Marijuana businesses also 
suffer severe tax consequences. For example, marijuana businesses must 
declare any income that they earn, and do so even though this might expose 
them to criminal prosecution or tax penalties.152 Since a marijuana retailer can 
only deduct “the cost of obtaining the goods for sale,” they must pay taxes on 
their gross receipts.153 “All other usual business expenses—retail rent, 
employee payroll, lights, and heating and cooling—cannot be deducted as they 
 
 146.  Id. at 517 (“Dispensaries themselves are burdened by the unenforced federal law as well. For 
instance, they might be held civilly liable under the federal racketeering statute, which is outside 
executive control.”). 
 147.  Id. at 513; see id. at 516–17 (“[F]ederal law likely does not allow banks to serve the industry, 
though recent enforcement guidance indicates that these rules will not be enforced against banks that 
comply with certain additional requirements.”).  
 148. Young, supra note 7, at 789; see Chemerinsky et al., supra note 11, at 79 (“Although 
President Obama has said that state policy experiments in Washington and Colorado are ‘important’ and 
should go forward, the continuing federal prohibition of marijuana substantially undermines these new 
state laws.”); Duke, supra note 12, at 1302 (“Unless reform occurs at the federal level, though, state-
level reforms face a myriad of limitations and uncertainties.”); id. at 1308 (“Prohibition is inconsistent 
with control, because only that which is legal can be regulated by law.”); Paul J. Larkin Jr., Regulation, 
Prohibition, and Overcriminalization: The Proper and Improper Uses of the Criminal Law, 42 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 745, 746 (2014) (arguing against the use of criminal law to enforce a regulatory 
regime because “[t]he function of the criminal law . . . is to enforce [a] moral code” while “the function 
of the regulatory system is to efficiently manage components of the . . . economy”), quoted in Kreit, 
supra note 68, at 706 n.73.  
 149.  Baude, supra note 96, at 517. See Kamin, supra note 16, at 1113 (“Because marijuana 
remains illegal at the federal level, much of the predictability that comes from enforceable contracts is 
unavailable to marijuana practitioners.”). 
 150.  Chemerinsky et al., supra note 11, at 97. 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  See generally id. at 79 (“Banks, attorneys, insurance companies, potential investors, and 
others—justifiably concerned about breaking federal law—are reluctant to navigate complex state and 
local regulations and provide investment capital, legal advice, and other basic professional services 
necessary for businesses to function. Federal tax rules treat these marijuana business activities like any 
other federal drug crime, which enormously increases tax liability by disallowing deductions for 
common business expenses. And those engaging in marijuana activity entirely legal under state law—
whether recreational or medical—still risk losing their jobs, parental rights, and many government 
benefits.”). 
 153.  Id. at 94. 
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can in any other business, either legitimate or illegal.”154 “Because marijuana 
remains contraband at the federal level,” companies and individuals who invest 
in state-authorized marijuana businesses “have no guarantee their investments 
are safe from the whims of federal law enforcement.”155 
Marijuana businesses cannot get loans from, or use the services of, a bank 
because of federal prohibitions on illegal financial transactions.156 
The lack of commercial banking is more than a dignitary harm for those 
operating in the marijuana industry; for many it is a sincere safety concern. 
Marijuana businesses present an easy target for thieves who are aware that 
these businesses often have no choice but to keep large quantities of cash 
on hand.157 
Even though in 2014, the Departments of Justice and Treasury issued joint 
memoranda “purporting” to allow banks to engage in business with those 
involved in the marijuana industry, the memoranda, “like the second Cole 
memo which preceded it, stopped short of removing the specter of future 
enforcement actions.”158 The cash basis of these operations also makes it more 
difficult for states to tax and regulate them.159 
Lawyers may run afoul of state bar rules prohibiting engagement in an 
illegal activity if they counsel anyone using or distributing marijuana.160 
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(d) and its state analogs prohibit 
attorneys from knowingly facilitating criminal conduct. A literal reading of 
that rule would preclude a lawyer from providing any assistance—e.g., 
 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Baude, supra note 96, at 519. 
 156.  Id. at 513 (“Because marijuana remains contraband at the federal level, businesses and 
lawmakers who invest in responsible legalization at the state level have no guarantee their investments 
are safe from the whims of federal law enforcement. Moreover, even if the federal drug laws are not 
actively enforced in those states, the laws create serious problems for banks, lawyers, and others who 
might otherwise want to work with the in-state marijuana industry.”); see also Chemerinsky et al., supra 
note 11, at 79 (“Banks, attorneys, insurance companies, potential investors, and others—justifiably 
concerned about breaking federal law—are reluctant to navigate complex state and local regulations and 
provide investment capital, legal advice, and other basic professional services necessary for businesses 
to function. Federal tax rules treat these marijuana business activities like any other federal drug crime, 
which enormously increases tax liability by disallowing deductions for common business expenses. And 
those engaging in marijuana activity entirely legal under state law—whether recreational or medical—
still risk losing their jobs, parental rights, and many government benefits.”). 
 157.  Id. at 91; see Kamin, supra note 16, at 1114 (“Principally, the lack of banking services keeps 
marijuana businesses operating in the shadows of society. As cash businesses, they are targets for 
violent crime.”). 
 158.  Kamin, supra note 16, at 1115. 
 159.  Chemerinsky et al., supra note 11, at 92. 
 160.  See generally Young, supra note 7, at 789–90. See also Baude, supra note 96, at 517 (“It is 
not clear whether lawyers can advise in-state dispensaries without being guilty of criminal conspiracy or 
accomplice liability.”); Kreit, supra note 68, at 695 (“Federal prohibition also leaves marijuana 
businesses with a great deal of uncertainty when it comes to intellectual property rights.”). 
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drafting contracts, negotiating leases—to clients whom the attorney knows 
are engaged in on-going violations of the CSA.161 
Even when a state may authorize lawyers to assist marijuana clients, this 
would not relieve them of having to tell their clients that there is “profound 
legal uncertainty” surrounding their representation because of the possibility of 
federal enforcement.162 
While the negative consequences discussed above primarily affect 
marijuana businesses, “the consequences are no less profound for those simply 
wishing to consume marijuana in compliance with their state’s laws.”163 As 
long as the CSA bans the use or possession of marijuana, “promises from the 
federal government to let the states take the lead in marijuana enforcement” do 
not eliminate the possibility of federal enforcement.164 As long as the federal 
ban is on the books, marijuana consumers run the risk of losing their jobs if 
their use is discovered, and any benefits they may have accrued,165 as well as 
custody of their children and the very real possibility of jail time or heavy 
fines.166 Practitioners could lose their medical licenses.167 Other public 
 
 161. Kamin, supra note 16, at 1116; see id. (discussing the split among states that have considered 
the question of a lawyer’s responsibility to provide professional services to individuals involved in the 
marijuana industry); Chemerinsky et al., supra note 11, at 95 (“The Model Rules of Professional 
Responsibility and the ethics rules of nearly every state prohibit an attorney from knowingly facilitating 
a client’s criminal conduct. Because nearly all the actions of a marijuana business remain violations of 
federal law, any assistance that a lawyer gives to a business that she knows to be in violation of federal 
law could be construed as an ethical violation. This is true not only when the lawyer helps a marijuana 
retailer purchase product from a marijuana grow facility—in other words, when she assists in the actual 
violations of federal law—but also when the lawyer incorporates the marijuana business, helps draft a 
lease, lobbies local government officials for a zoning exemption, or negotiates an employment 
agreement. Because all these tasks help a marijuana business to break federal law, there is a plausible 
argument that the lawyer subjects herself to discipline for knowingly doing so.”). 
 162.  Chemerinsky et al., supra note 11, at 95. 
 163.  Kamin, supra note 16 at 1118; see id. at 1120 (“[C]ontinued prohibition of marijuana at the 
federal level leads to unsettled expectations, not just for those trying to make a living in the marijuana 
industry but also for those who would take advantage of state laws permitting marijuana use.”). 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Id. (“Currently, one of the biggest impediments to the legalization of marijuana in the states is 
the fact that those who test positive for marijuana can lose their employment even if their conduct is 
entirely consistent with state law.”); see id. (“Colorado courts have concluded that an individual fired for 
testing positive for marijuana is ineligible for unemployment benefits under the same reasoning, even if 
that individual is a marijuana patient acting in compliance with state law.”). 
 166.  See generally Young, supra note 7, at 789–90; see Duke, supra note 12, at 1307 (“[A]s long 
as federal prohibition remains in place, those who distribute, grow, or possess marijuana are risking 
severe federal civil and criminal sanctions.”); Chemerinsky et al., supra note 11, at 99 (“While there is 
little case law on point, it is becoming increasingly clear that marijuana use will likely play a role in 
family law proceedings, particularly in child custody disputes. Some courts have held that a parent’s 
medical marijuana use alone cannot form the basis of diminishing her parenting rights. But there is no 
guarantee that marijuana use—even use sanctioned by state law—will not provide a basis for 
diminishing a parent’s rights.”). Professor Duke asserts that prohibition of marijuana damages can 
destroy lives because of the high rate of incarceration for mere possession of marijuana (in 2010, 46 
percent of the drug arrests were for possession of marijuana, resulting in 800,000 arrests). Id. at 1311. 
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benefits, such as public housing and student loans to government employees, 
“are conditioned on the recipient’s abstinence from illegal-drug use.”168 State 
courts have used the federal ban on marijuana to deny parole or probation to 
otherwise qualified criminal defendants, even though marijuana is legal in that 
state.169 The possibility of federal enforcement gives federal prosecutors a 
“lever” to use against individuals who have been targeted by the criminal 
justice system for some other reason.170 More people are arrested for marijuana 
offenses than for violent crimes,171 and those arrested are more likely to be 
blacks and Latinos than whites.172 
In addition to the harms visited on businesses and individuals from federal 
criminalization of marijuana, the federal position has also undermined states 
that have legalized marijuana.173 Since states cannot legalize marijuana on their 
own “either as a formal or as a practical manner,”174 the federal ban has created 
“a highly unstable situation” where the threat of enforcement inhibits 
regulatory innovation at the state level.175 
The “uncertainty that conflicting federal and state laws create also 
discourages individuals who want to grow marijuana legally from entering the 
market, depressing the supply from legal growers, and allowing illegal growers 
to continue to meet the unmet demand of the market.”176 An unregulated 
marijuana market enables illegal growers “to move their product into legal 
channels,” like marijuana dispensaries, instead of disposing of it as contraband 
on the street.177 Although the creation of legal markets for the drug may “dry 
 
 167.  Duke, supra note 12, at 1306 (“It is also conceivable, though I doubt its legality, that a state, 
while itself legalizing or medicalizing marijuana, could deny or revoke professional or occupational 
licenses to compliant users for violating federal law.”). 
 168.  Kamin, supra note 16, at 1119. 
 169.  Id. at 1118. 
 170.  Young, supra note 7, at 789–90. 
 171.  Duke, supra note 12, at 1303. 
 172.  Id. at 1312 (“Although Blacks and Latinos account for no more than twenty percent of the 
drug-using population, they comprise eighty-six percent of those who are arrested for marijuana 
possession in New York City.”).  
 173.  Kamin, supra note 16, at 1121 (“[T]he problem with the status quo is that marijuana 
possession, manufacture, and distribution remain illegal under the second Cole memo. Even if the 
government keeps its promise not to intervene in states that have enacted robust marijuana regulations, 
the continuance of federal marijuana prohibition has a profound effect in those states.”). 
 174.  Young, supra note 7, at 789–90; see Chemerinsky et al., supra note 11, at 113 (“Expectations 
are unsettled and state policy goals are frustrated by the legal-but-not-entirely-legal status of marijuana 
in twenty-three states.”). 
 175.  Young, supra note 7, at 789–90; see also Chemerinsky et al., supra note 11, at 77 (“Divergent 
federal and state laws also create debilitating instability and uncertainty on the ground in those states 
that are pioneering new approaches to marijuana control.”); Kreit, supra note 68, at 710 (“[R]egardless 
of the details, replacing federal prohibition with regulation would leave states free to decide to legalize 
marijuana without having to obtain a federal waiver or leaving state-legal marijuana businesses at risk of 
federal prosecution. In this sort of system, state legalization laws would not have to operate with federal 
prohibition lurking in the background.”). 
 176.  Reitz, supra note 3, at 1089–90 n.22. 
 177.  Id.  
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up” black markets where the drug is currently sold, legalizing the drug state-by-
state will take time and will not stop “growers who exploit public land” from 
making “big money” by exporting their illegally grown crop to states where the 
drug “remains illegal and the black-market price is higher.”178 
By insisting on criminalizing marijuana, the federal government has lost 
effective “state and local enforcement partners,”179 as well as “the chance to 
harness state energy and creativity to responsibly regulate marijuana and 
control interstate spillovers.”180 The ambiguity and secrecy surrounding a 
criminalized industry hide associated environmental impacts and impede efforts 
to abate those impacts.181 
The semi-legal status of the medical market and the significant intermixing 
of the medical and black markets complicate regulation of the industry. As 
a result, local marijuana-specific laws and regulations, as well as other 
existing state and federal laws that apply (e.g. the state Fish & Game Code 
and Water code and the federal Clean Water Act and Endangered Species 
Act) are currently inconsistently and lightly enforced.182 
This confused federalism “status separates marijuana from fully legal 
agricultural commodities and greatly complicates regulation of the industry.”183 
On the other hand, criminalizing the production and use of marijuana is easier 
than legalizing it because all it means is that there are existing state and federal 
laws that could be enforced more rigorously.184 
One area in which federal enforcement could be effective is against the 
marijuana traffickers who are growing marijuana illegally in California and 
Colorado as a way of avoiding the U.S. border patrol interdicting imported 
marijuana.185 Mexican drug cartels, which once earned $1.1 to $2 billion 
dollars exporting marijuana to the United States, are now selling illegally 
grown marijuana to local legal dispensaries or smuggling it to other states 
where its sale is illegal.186 These are very “cost-effective business venture[s],” 
as there are no land acquisition or regulatory compliance costs, which have 
 
 178.  Levy, supra note 2, at 270. 
 179.  Young, supra note 7, at 790. 
 180.  Baude, supra note 96, at 539. 
 181.  Carah et al., supra note 9, at 827. 
 182.  Id. at 826. 
 183.  Id. at 823. 
 184.  See Reid, supra note 12, at 188. 
 185.  Id. at 189; see Levy, supra note 2, at 268 (“After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, 
border security was tightened. Smuggling pot into the United States became too risky, and international 
groups of marijuana growers began to move into California’s national parks, forests, and tribal lands.”). 
These traffickers kidnap and force Mexican nationals to work on illegal-marijuana grow sites. Reid, 
supra note 12, at 189; see also Levy, supra note 2, at 268 (“Many of the growers—at least those who do 
the grunt work, the ones who get arrested—come from south of the Mexican border.”). 
 186.  Reid, supra note 12, at 189–90; id. at 203 (“In 2012, in Colorado alone, ‘there were 274 
marijuana interdiction seizures destined for other states, compared to 54 of such seizures in 2005. This is 
a 407 percent increase.’”). 
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generated millions of dollars in cash that is then sent back to Mexico.187 As a 
result of these operations, “marijuana production levels in the United States 
have become comparable to that in Mexico.”188 But the federal government is 
barely visible as an enforcement presence. 
B.  The Benefits of Decriminalization, Legalization, and Regulation 
There are discernible benefits from decriminalizing marijuana, or at 
minimum continuing the Administration’s policy of non-enforcement, and then 
regulating it at either the federal or state level. There would be popular support 
for the position: an end to the harms federal criminalization has visited on 
commercial enterprises and individuals. Doing this might slow the flow of 
illegally cultivated marijuana into the market place and thus curtail its 
production, and end the debilitating charade of non-enforcement of a federal 
crime, among other benefits. At a more abstract level, decriminalizing 
marijuana might lessen the impact of non-enforcement on “the moral authority 
of law”189 and improve confidence in government.190 
Legalization of marijuana could lower the drug’s cost and thus make it 
less attractive to those who are growing it illegally. In California, where 
legalization of medical marijuana has enabled marijuana consumers to grow 
their own marijuana legally, the cost of the drug has dropped, and with it the 
demand for illegal marijuana.191 However, this price drop has had a negative 
effect on the local economies of some California communities that rely heavily 
on marijuana production,192 requiring some commercial growers in those 
communities to expand their operations to keep profitable or even encourage 
 
 187.  Id. at 190. 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100 NW. U. L. 
REV. 655, 659–62 (2006); see Katrina Fischer Kuh, When Government Intrudes: Regulating Individual 
Behaviors that Harm the Environment, 61 DUKE L.J. 1111, 1120 n.22 (2012) (citing Cheng, supra note 
189, at 659–62). 
 190.  See Werner F. Ebke, Enforcement Techniques Within the European Communities: Flying 
Close to the Sun with Waxen Wings, 50 J. AIR L. & COM. 685, 720 (1985) (Referring to the “macro” 
effect of “micro” motives, Ebke says that these motives nonetheless deserve “special attention,” going 
on to note, “[i]n the context” of enforcing against violations by member states of various European 
Community treaties, “that, because of increasing economic and financial difficulties, the member states, 
like individuals, more frequently seem to feel a sense of helplessness and futility about their capacity to 
influence the conduct of the other member states for the sake of the common objectives. These feelings 
often may result in an increasing willingness of at least some of the member states not to conform with 
Community obligations, though they may well realize and recognize that even minor violations of the 
law of the Communities tend to lessen public and private confidence in the Community and that this 
lack of confidence in turn endangers the possibilities of achieving the Communities’ objectives as set 
forth in the constitutive Treaties.”). Id. 
 191.  Starr, supra note 5, at 1094. 
 192.  Id. 
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first-time cultivators to get into the business,193 making them a target for drug 
cartels to exploit.194 
Regulated drugs are substantially safer, meaning that consumers can trust 
that the drug will not be either poisonous or contaminated in some way.195 
Legalizing marijuana might also eliminate the crime and violence that is 
associated with its production.196 “In the United States, large criminal 
organizations maintained by violence and bribery increasingly control the 
networks that distribute marijuana.”197 Many terrorist organizations are 
financed by distributing drugs.198 Given the ineffectiveness of enforcing the 
ban against these criminal organizations, enforcement resources might be better 
spent enforcing against those serious secondary crimes instead of being 
distracted by the ban, which is perhaps even indirectly facilitating those 
crimes.199 
If marijuana were no longer prohibited, enforcement costs, like the costs 
of jailing offenders, might decrease200 and revenues might rise because the sale 
of marijuana could be taxed.201 While some states that have legalized 
marijuana are considering taxing it, as long as producing or distributing the 
drug remains a federal crime, few marijuana businesses will either file tax 
forms or pay taxes at the state level that might end up with their federal 
prosecution.202 While decriminalization may reduce some of the costs 
associated with the federal ban, it could, at the same time, encourage black-
market distribution as demand for the drug increases and make the violence and 
corruption that are innate to illegal distribution networks worse, unless the drug 
is simultaneously fully legalized and regulated.203 
 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  Id. at 1095. 
 195.  Duke, supra note 12, at 1308. 
 196.  Id. at 1309; see Diana Marcum, Central Valley’s Booming Medical Marijuana Crop Draws 
Violence, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct/02/local/la-me-pot-crop-2010-
1003. 
 197.  Duke, supra note 12, at 1309; see Starr, supra note 5, at 1098 (“Considering that large-scale 
grow operations present a more lucrative opportunity to anyone who would use violence to obtain or 
protect the plants and that large-scale operations often take place on public lands, cultivation of a large 
number of plants increases the probability and extent of violent crime and environmental degradation.”). 
 198.  Duke, supra note 12, at 1309. 
 199.  Id. at 1310–11. 
 200.  Keith Humphreys, So, Something Interesting Happens to Weed After It’s Legal, WASH. POST: 
WONKBLOG (May 4, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/05/04/the-price-of-
legal-pot-is-collapsing/. (“[B]argain-basement prices undercuts the black market, bringing the public 
reduced law enforcement costs, both in terms of tax dollars spent on jail and the damage done to 
individuals who are arrested.”). 
 201.  Duke, supra note 12, at 1313. But see Humphreys, supra note 200, at 2 (commenting that 
states will receive less sales tax revenue if the price of marijuana declines). 
 202.  Duke, supra note 12, at 1313 (projecting that six billion dollars could be raised annually by 
taxing the sale of marijuana). 
 203.  Id. at 1316. See Carah et al., supra note 9, at 827 (“In addition, black markets (and the 
environmental impacts associated with black-market cultivation) are unlikely to disappear in the face of 
local liberalization policies. . . . For example, black market–marijuana cultivation remains a problem in 
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Legalizing marijuana would decrease the amount of clandestine indoor 
cultivation of the drug, which would dramatically reduce energy production 
and the resulting carbon footprint of indoor production.204 Indoor marijuana 
production would likely transition out-of-doors, enabling farmers and other 
producers to transition into marijuana cultivation with confidence and security. 
However, this transition may have no impact on the illegal marijuana 
cultivation on federal lands, if at the same time the black market for marijuana 
does not also decrease. 
When producing and cultivating marijuana is no longer a federal crime, its 
distribution should become more efficient and the drug less costly to 
purchase.205 This is because the federal ban imposes many costs on illegal drug 
producers, such as the costs of operating secretly, not advertising, having to pay 
higher wages to compensate for the risk of arrest, and inability to use courts to 
resolve contract disputes.206 Legal companies bear none of these costs and can 
benefit from economies of scale that can further reduce production costs.207 
Legalizing marijuana would turn what had been a criminal matter into an 
administrative one of licenses and permits.208 Marijuana consumers would feel 
morally comfortable209 and secure, which could lead to more consumption210 
and a stronger marijuana market. Opponents of legalization argue that 
increased consumption will correspondingly increase the need for treatment 
programs as more consumers become dependent on the drug.211 However, 
 
Colorado despite the legalization of recreational use. . . . Legalization will likely increase 
consumption—and may increase demand or black market marijuana—depending on how markets are 
regulated and enforcement conducted.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 204.  Reitz, supra note 3, at 1094. 
 205.  Duke, supra note 12, at 1314–15; see Humphreys, supra note 200 (reporting on the fall in 
marijuana prices in Washington of about 2 percent per month, predicting a possible drop of “25 percent 
each year going forward”). 
 206.  Humphreys, supra note 200. 
 207.  Id. 
 208.  Reid, supra note 12, at 184. 
 209.  Hudak, supra note 63, at 664 (“‘The introduction of retail sales,’ according to the Chief of the 
Colorado Association of Chiefs of Police, ‘was at least a more honest conversation than medical.’”); see 
id. at 665 (“By reducing the recourse to wink-and-nod circumventions of medical-marijuana rules, such 
‘policy honesty’ may temper resentment, improve the new policy’s perceived legitimacy, and encourage 
compliance.”). 
 210.  Duke, supra note 12, at 1315; but see Young, supra note 7, at 789–90 (“[N]ot everyone is 
Justice Holmes’s ‘bad man’—that is, motivated only by the fear of sanctions. Even if adverse legal 
consequences are unlikely, some persons may have strong moral or religious aversions to law 
breaking.”). 
 211.  Reid, supra note 12, at 177–78 (“In one study, nine percent of those who used marijuana 
became clinically dependent on it.”); see id. at 180–81 (“Negative consequences of legalization may 
include: 1. a higher incidence of emphysema and other respiratory problems, and increased effects of 
second-hand marijuana smoke; 2. increased use of more potent drugs by those who use marijuana as a 
potential gateway drug, impaired mental health based upon prolonged use; 3. adverse education and 
employment outcomes, and higher rate of automobile crashes; 4. increased secondary effects on children 
that ensue from parental use of marijuana; and, 5. impair[ed] short-term memory and motor 
coordination, slow[er] reaction time, alter[ed] mood, judgment, and decision-making, and . . . severe 
anxiety (paranoia) or psychosis (loss of touch with reality).”). Reid adds “[h]owever, compared to 
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since criminal enforcement of the illegal possession of marijuana has declined, 
increasing the supply of the drug will not inevitably increase demand nor will it 
lead to more “egregious criminal behavior.”212 “For many, the benefits of using 
marijuana would be realized with little or no risks.”213 
The marijuana industry supports decriminalization because ineffective 
regulation and enforcement can lead to serious public policy problems, causing 
public support for the industry to “plummet.”214 Allowing state regulation to 
proceed would “incorporate the idea of state marijuana legalization into federal 
law in a way that would make it hard to turn back.”215 Thus, federal marijuana 
regulation would, in essence “be a concession to the idea that existing state-
level medical and recreational marijuana laws are not going anywhere and that 
state marijuana legalization is a legitimate policy option.”216 And treatment of 
the marijuana industry as part of the federal criminal justice system might 
actually increase federal control over the drug either by having the federal 
government enforce its prohibition in states that want the drug banned or 
license its manufacture and sale in states that have legalized it.217 In either 
situation, the federal government would have a strong hand in the drug’s 
regulation. The federal government could use these licenses to prevent 
marijuana commercialization, for example, by limiting retailers to one license 
at one location, and could strictly limit the amount of marijuana that can be 
produced annually under a marijuana license—“in effect resulting in a 
marijuana market made of exclusively craft beer-size manufacturers.”218 
And it is not as though enforcement of the federal ban has been successful. 
“Most medical marijuana users and suppliers can feel confident they will never 
be caught by the federal government.”219 Federal eradication efforts have only 
induced growers “to establish ‘guerilla patches,’ which are harder to see using 
 
alcohol, marijuana is less toxic, has a lower addiction risk, and has a weaker link to traffic accidents and 
violence.” Id. at 181; see also Kreit, supra note 68, at 712–13 (“While legalization skeptics have cited a 
range of concerns, perhaps chief among them is the specter of a large-scale commercial marijuana 
industry . . . [which] would invest heavily in promoting and advertising marijuana . . . . As former 
Secretary of Health Education and Welfare Joseph A. Califano Jr. put it, ‘not only would legalized drugs 
be more openly available . . . but of even greater damage to our children would be the commercial 
reality that Madison Avenue marketers would be free to glamorize substances like marijuana.’”). 
 212.  Reid, supra note 12, at 178. 
 213.  Id.  
 214.  Hudak, supra note 63, at 665 (“ . . . industry wants effective regulation and enforcement. 
Members of the industry realize that if inadequate regulation leads to serious public policy problems, 
public support may plummet. Moreover, the threat of federal intervention, however defined, looms large 
over the legal marijuana market in Colorado, and that threat induces members of the industry to push for 
and comply with regulations”). 
 215.  Kreit, supra note 68, at 711–12. 
 216.  Id. 
 217.  Id. at 713–14. 
 218.  Id. at 714. 
 219.  Mikos, supra note 6, at 1424. 
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aerial surveillance techniques, and have also caused them to move their 
operations to public lands.”220 
Decriminalization would allow states to function as laboratories to identify 
effective marijuana regulatory programs and then share that information with 
each other and with new states that want to legalize the drug. Despite the cloud 
of federal enforcement, many states that have legalized marijuana have 
designed robust programs to regulate its use.221 However, the CSA restricts the 
extent to which states can experiment with drug laws because those laws are 
potentially illegal should the federal government’s current lenient policy 
toward state regulation end.222 If marijuana were not criminalized, there might 
be even more experimentation at the state level and open exchange of 
information. 
The cost-benefit balance of current marijuana policy tips pretty decidedly 
toward federal decriminalization and state regulation. However, the political 
likelihood of the former happening is low. Accordingly, the next Part discusses 
possible resolutions of the federalism conflict with the hope that the resolutions 
might have some impact on illegal marijuana cultivation. 
IV.  POSSIBLE RESOLUTIONS OF THE FEDERALISM CONFLICT OVER     
MARIJUANA POLICY 
Most scholarly attention about marijuana has focused on resolving the 
federalism conflict,223 which Dean Erwin Chemerinsky calls “one of the most 
important federalism conflicts in a generation.”224 Several of these scholars 
propose either defying or amending the CSA, for example, by not enforcing it, 
nullifying it, or opting out of its provisions, while others propose a cooperative- 
or fused-federalism approach modeled on alcohol regulation. Non-enforcement 
 
 220.  Starr, supra note 5, at 1092. 
 221.  See generally Mikos, supra note 6, at 1428–32. 
 222.  See Manski, supra note 18, at 1008 (“At present, the federal [CSA] mandates a uniform 
national classification of drugs that limits the ability of the states to effectively vary the drug laws that 
persons face. The Act consequently prevents implementation of the federalist version of adaptive 
diversification.”). 
 223.  See, e.g., Mikos, supra note 6, at 1460 (“The anti-commandeering rule permits Congress to 
encourage positive action it cannot oblige states to take. When it comes to marijuana, Congress could 
offer states (1) money or (2) regulatory power in return for a promise to re-criminalize use for medical 
purposes. As long as the inducement Congress offers is not coercive, it would not offend existing anti-
commandeering doctrine..”); Kreit, supra note 68, at 699–700 (identifying four different categories of 
reconciliation approaches: “(1) preventing the Department of Justice from spending money to interfere 
with state marijuana laws; (2) providing an affirmative defense based on compliance with state 
marijuana laws; (3) letting states opt out of federal marijuana prohibition; and (4) ending the federal ban 
on marijuana and replacing it with some sort of federal regulatory structure.”); David S. Schwartz, High 
Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 567 (2013) (discussing the federalism crisis created by state legalization of marijuana and the 
CSA’s “blanket federal marijuana prohibition” and the application of the “anti-commandeering clear 
statement rule”). 
 224.  Chemerinsky et al., supra note 11, at 77. It is not as though there have not been proposals by 
scholars of ways to resolve that conflict; there have been many.  
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and nullification are constitutionally dubious, and each of the other approaches 
requires unlikely congressional action. While cooperative federalism might 
provide a politically less contentious path forward, neither it nor any of the 
other options directly address what is happening on public lands. However, 
reconciliation of the conflict, allowing states to legalize marijuana, might 
increase the number of legal cultivators, reducing the strength of the black 
market, and might also redirect federal officials to enforce against illegal 
operations on public lands.225 
A.  Tolerance, Nullification, Opt Outs, and Waivers 
1.  Tolerance 
 
The current approach of the federal government towards state legalization 
of marijuana is to tolerate it.226 By ignoring various state laws legalizing 
medical and increasingly recreational use of the drug, the federal government 
avoids any direct conflict with the states. It is a policy of necessity because 
there are too few federal resources to enforce violations of the ban in states that 
have legalized the drug, let alone elsewhere. Tolerance has dropped a scrim, a 
semi-transparent curtain, between the federal government and the states on the 
topic of marijuana enforcement. 
However, there are serious problems with this approach, including its 
dubious constitutionality. Anything short of Congress authorizing the federal 
government not to enforce a federal statute has the effect of suspending that 
statute, usurping “Congress’s constitutional authority” to set national policy.227 
Moving beyond the Second Cole Memorandum permissiveness to a “more 
definite nonenforcement policy” runs this risk—“[p]rosecutorial discretion 
does not permit the executive to fix the pall of legal uncertainty that hangs over 
 
 225.  But see Young, supra note 7, at 775 n.28 (“As the husband of a federal prosecutor, however, I 
must note that federal enforcement policy seems to be different with respect to marijuana use on federal 
lands—such as national parks, forests, and seashores. At least in North Carolina, marijuana crimes 
continue to be pursued when they occur in these federal enclaves, even though the Feds might be 
unlikely to prosecute such crimes where the state has primary jurisdiction.”). 
 226.  Federal tolerance of conflicting state laws raises the question why the federal government has 
chosen not to preempt those laws. Adler, supra note 1, at 506 (saying in addition that the government 
has not tried to preempt those laws, including laws that “affirmatively license and regulate a growing 
marijuana industry”). Kamin notes that if the federal government sued to enjoin a state law legalizing 
marijuana it would lead to a “showdown over the preemptive power of the CSA, an issue that has not 
been tested to date” in the courts. Kamin, supra note 16, at 1108; see Mikos, supra note 6, at 1460 (“In 
sum, the anti-commandeering rule bars Congress from preempting state medical marijuana exemptions 
and accompanying registration/ID programs . . . . And Congress could go a step further and preempt 
both state laws requiring police to return marijuana and laws protecting citizens from private sanctions, 
but for the most part it has not yet done so.”). 
 227.  Baude, supra note 96, at 522; id. at 538 (“[F]ederal prosecutorial discretion has not 
traditionally extended to ‘prospective licensing of prohibited conduct.’”) (quoting Zachary S. Price, 
Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 675 (2014)). 
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state markets and regulations.”228 Moreover, applying federal law in some 





Some scholars think there is no federalism conflict because the states 
already possess the power to regulate marijuana.230 They advocate a modern 
form of nullification, enabling the states to take over marijuana regulation, as is 
their right.231 For example, Professor Ernest Young argues that contrary to 
South Carolina’s “infamous” ordinance, most modern nullifications may be 
legal.232  “They generally do not purport to alter the binding force of federal 
law, but they rely on the likelihood that, as a practical matter, federal 
authorities cannot enforce national law without the cooperation of state 
officials.”233 
According to Young, “the history of marijuana legalization over the past 
decades suggests that, at least on some issues, contemporary nullification is a 
winning strategy,” saying that California and other states that have legalized 
marijuana have made a “good” bet that the CSA is unlikely to be enforced 
unless states cooperate.234 He considers these states to be engaging in 
“functional—not principled—nullification,” the on-the-ground effect of which 
is “very close to what John C. Calhoun’s South Carolina hoped to achieve.”235 
He also argues that when regulatory jurisdictional spheres “overlap,” as they do 
in the case of marijuana enforcement, “the fact that state officials do not work 
for federal authorities affords the states important opportunities to influence—
and sometimes defy—the enforcement of federal law.”236 While Young admits 
that nullification will not be successful if there are direct beneficiaries of 
federal regulation who could sue to compel enforcement of federal law,237 it is 
hard to think of who they might be here. 
 
 228.  Baude, supra note 96, at 538; see Kreit, supra note 68, at 696 (“[T]he dividing line between 
acceptable guidance about how to use limited law enforcement resources and a problematic de facto 
suspension of federal law by the Executive is open to debate. But, at the very least, a sustained 
nonenforcement policy presents difficult questions about executive power and the rule of law.”). 
 229.  Kreit, supra note 68, at 696. 
 230.  See Young, supra note 7, at 772; see also Mikos, supra note 6, at 1426 (saying “states 
(generally) possess legal authority to enact permissive legislation governing such issues, in spite of 
contrary congressional policy,” and all that the states are doing is “merely restoring the state of nature”). 
 231.  Young, supra note 7, at 770 (“[S]tate officials derive the power to defy federal policy from 
the fact that they are not servants, but rather officers of a different government with an independent base 
of legitimacy and accountability.”).  
 232.  See id. at 772. 
 233.  See id. 
 234.  See id. at 772, 776. 
 235.  See id. at 776. 
 236.  See id. at 794. 
 237.  See id. at 791. 
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However, like non-enforcement, nullification presents a shaky 
constitutional foundation for any resolution of the existing federalism conflict. 
 
3.  Opt Outs and Waivers 
 
An alternative approach is to allow states to “opt out” of or seek a waiver 
from the CSA’s marijuana provisions.238 Professor Sam Kamin proposes that 
Congress amend the CSA to allow states to “opt out of its marijuana 
provisions” and authorize the Attorney General “to certify that a state is 
regulating marijuana in a manner consistent with federal priorities.”239 If a state 
fails to meet these criteria, the default would be “an essentially unenforceable 
federal prohibition,”240 rather than the federal government substituting its own 
regulatory program and becoming the primary regulator, as is common in 
cooperative federalism schemes under pollution-control laws.241 
 
 238.  Any proposal that would remove marijuana from the CSA is vehemently opposed by large 
drug companies, which have lobbied vigorously to preserve the existing status of the drug. See 
Christopher Ingraham, One Striking Chart Shows Why Pharma Companies are Fighting Legal 
Marijuana, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (July 13, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk-
/wp/2016/07/13/one-striking-chart-shows-why-pharma-companies-are-fighting-legal-marijuana/ (“These 
companies have long been at the forefront of opposition to marijuana reform, funding research by anti-
pot academics and funneling dollars to groups, such as the Community Anti-Drug Coalition of America, 
that oppose marijuana legalization.”). 
 239.  Kamin, supra note 16, at 1120–21. A variation of waiver is to allow states to “nullify the 
application of the CSA in their jurisdictions”; see, e.g., Young, supra note 7, at 772 (“Unlike South 
Carolina’s infamous ordinance, most of these instances of modern-day nullification may well be legal. 
They generally do not purport to alter the binding force of federal law, but they rely on the likelihood 
that, as a practical matter, federal authorities cannot enforce national law without the cooperation of 
state officials. The history of marijuana legalization over the past decades suggests that, at least on some 
issues, contemporary nullification is a winning strategy.”). Young cites California and those states that 
have legalized marijuana as making a bet, which he calls a “good one,” that the CSA is unlikely to be 
enforced unless states cooperate, and engaging in “functional—not principled—nullification, but its 
effect on the ground is very close to what John C. Calhoun’s South Carolina hoped to achieve.” Id. at 
776. He also argues that when regulatory jurisdictional spheres “overlap, the fact that state officials do 
not work for federal authorities affords the states important opportunities to influence—and sometimes 
defy—the enforcement of federal law.” Id. at 794. 
 240.  Kreit, supra note 68, at 708. See Chemerinsky et al., supra note 11, at 80 (“Under our 
cooperative federalism approach the Attorney General would be required to create a certification process 
allowing states to opt out of the CSA’s marijuana provisions if state laws and regulatory frameworks 
satisfy enforcement criteria that the DOJ has already announced. In opt-out states certified by the 
Attorney General, only state law would govern marijuana-related activities and the CSA marijuana 
provisions would cease to apply. Federal agencies could continue to cooperate with opt-out states and 
their local governments to jointly enforce marijuana laws, but state law rather than the CSA would 
control within those states’ borders. Equally important, nothing would change in those states content 
with the status quo under the CSA.”). 
 241.  Young, supra note 7, at 781 (“As Colorado and Washington are demonstrating, their ability to 
oppose federal policy—and get away with it, to a considerable extent—arises from the blending of 
federal and state institutions within cooperative federalism schemes. The federal government depends on 
state cooperation to enforce national law, and that dependence is what empowers state officials to 
dissent . . . . [T]his power of opposition may not extend far enough for dissenting states to establish and 
secure their own policies, but they can at least force a national conversation and some sort of 
compromise on the issues they care about.”); see id. at 775 (“Hence, the ‘War on Drugs’ amounts to a 
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Chemerinsky and his co-authors label Kamin’s solution a “permissive 
federalism approach,” under which Congress might authorize federal agencies 
to grant states temporary, revocable waivers of the CSA’s marijuana provisions 
based on specific criteria.242 In contrast, their approach would allow “states to 
operate as laboratories of ideas, generating regulatory models that could serve 
as templates for federal policy,”243 legalizing conduct that would otherwise be 
illegal in that state.244 Since neither Kamin’s nor Chemerinsky’s “more 
modest” approach repeals or ignores the CSA, it may offer a more appealing 
political resolution of the federalism conflict.245 It may also provide a better 
barrier to federal enforcement than the Second Cole Memorandum, which does 
nothing to make illegal action legal and under which non-enforcement is 
dependent on a government’s constitutionally dubious promise not to 
enforce.246 By not eliminating the federal government entirely from the field of 
marijuana regulation, it also avoids the risk of completely relying on the states, 
whose programs are less than perfect.247 
 
cooperative federalism regime not all that different, say, from state implementation of the Clean Air 
Act.”); id. (“Federal marijuana policy thus depends heavily on state and local enforcement. In this sense, 
drug policy parallels any number of other federal regulatory regimes—from environmental policy to 
Medicaid—in which state officials play a critical role in implementing federal policy.”). Although 
Young finds nothing unusual in this form of cooperative federalism, which he says is also common in 
criminal law where the two jurisdictions “share constitutional jurisdiction over drug crimes,” it is a bit 
unusual when the two levels of government have disagreed over which activities to criminalize, which is 
the second element he identifies as a basis for shared authority. Young also notes that the federal 
government in the case of marijuana regulation plays “a decidedly secondary role . . . [because the] 
overall ratio of federal to state and local law enforcement personnel in this country is roughly one to ten, 
and drug enforcement is not the priority it once was.”). Id. at 774. 
 242.  Chemerinsky et al., supra note 11, at 81, 115. 
 243.  Id. at 115 (“During the period of the waiver, participating states could experiment with their 
own laws and regulations while the federal government agrees not to enforce federal law.”). According 
to Young, some of the advantages of “modern-day nullification” include “the traditional benefits of 
federalist policy diversity but also the potential to defuse important and intractable problems of 
separations of powers at the national level.” Young, supra note 7, at 773. 
 244.  Chemerinsky et al., supra note 11, at 117. The authors cite as examples of this approach the 
Clean Air and Clean Water Acts and operation of Health Care exchanges under the Affordable Care Act. 
Id. at 117–18. 
 245.  See id. at 122 (“With growing majorities of Americans in favor of legalizing marijuana, the 
tension between state and federal law will not resolve itself. Short of a decision by Congress to drop 
marijuana from the CSA entirely—an unlikely political outcome even given the majority of Americans 
who might favor it—a more modest federal legislative solution is needed. The cooperative federalism 
solution that we suggest is both feasible and effective—it will allow state experimentation to proceed 
while giving the federal government the ability to influence the direction of that legal change.”); but see 
Reid, supra note 12, at 204 (“However, this proposed solution [cooperative federalism] flies in the face 
of the rule of law: A collection of legal principles that all relate to the placement of limitations on the 
exercise of political power and the operation of government. Those principles include (1) government 
must follow its own rules; (2) government must apply the law impartially; and (3) government must 
provide due process for those accused of breaking the rules.”). 
 246.  Chemerinsky et al., supra note 11, at 115. 
 247.  Baude, supra note 96, at 518 (“Early reports, however, suggest that there may nonetheless be 
substantial diversion of marijuana out of Colorado. The quantity limits are easily evaded because 
purchases are not tracked and visitors can purchase the limit from multiple stores, even in a single 
day.”); see id. (“Moreover, interactions between the state’s growing limits and the state’s possession 
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At the same time, this approach would require legislative action 
authorizing federal agencies to grant waivers, which would itself be 
problematic given Congress’s steadfast opposition to anything that smacks of 
legalization of marijuana.248 
B.  Cooperative or Shared Federalism 
The cooperative, or shared, federalism approach is reflected in current 
alcohol policy. Alcohol regulation may be a good template for marijuana policy 
because of the obvious parallels between the two histories. “Like marijuana 
criminalization, the movement towards prohibiting alcohol was mostly 
politically motivated, and had racist roots.”249 Federal prohibition in both cases 
empowered organized-crime organizations: in the case of alcohol, bootleggers 
and mobsters, and in the case of marijuana, drug cartels.250 In both cases, 
“neighboring countries supplied America’s demand for the outlawed 
substance—Canada for liquor and Mexico for marijuana.”251 In both cases, it 
has been “impossible to eradicate the drug’s source, and efforts to interdict the 
smuggling of the drug have only marginal effects on price and 
consumption.”252 And in both cases, initial federal enforcement focused on 
consumers rather than producers or distributors of the illegal substances, 
making “the least culpable” suffer.253 This led states, consecutively, to decline 
to enforce the federal ban—in the case of marijuana, decriminalization or 
legalization—leaving the bulk of the enforcement burden to the federal 
government.254 “The stark contrast between the attitudes about marijuana held 
 
limits may be leading to leakage into the black market. Officials in some neighboring states claim that 
Colorado marijuana has led to large increases in marijuana trafficking in their state”); Hudak, supra note 
63, at 666–73 (including among the problems with Colorado rollout, an increase in the medical 
marijuana rolls. This results in less revenue for the state, because the tax and fee structure for medical 
marijuana is substantially lower than for retail marijuana. Thus, “current policies drive tourists to the 
edibles market, creating risks for public health and safety.”); but see id. at 660 (“In Colorado, 
fortunately, both the Department of Revenue and MED had a constitutional mandate, public and 
legislative support, industry cooperation, and the political space to reform a troubled institution in ways 
that improved governance, rather than simply satisfied politics.”).   
 248.  See Mikos, supra note 6, at 1434 (2009) (“The federal government has steadfastly refused to 
expand legal access to marijuana. Congress has rejected proposals to reschedule the drug or to suspend 
enforcement of the CSA against people who may use marijuana under state law. Likewise, the federal 
Drug Enforcement Agency [] has denied petitions to reschedule the drug administratively.”). 
 249.  Reitz, supra note 3, at 1091 (“For example, during the alcohol prohibition era, prohibitionists 
claimed that alcohol could turn ‘black [men] into [] beast[s]’ and Hispanic men into killers. Still, while 
alcohol prohibition had racist roots, its primary purpose was to save white people from themselves, and 
was founded on religious rhetoric. In contrast, marijuana laws were largely built around racist rhetoric 
framed as saving whites from minorities, and saving minorities from their lack of self-control.”); see id. 
(“This enduring legacy of racism in marijuana laws may help to explain its longevity in comparison to 
alcohol prohibition, which came and went rather quickly.”). 
 250.  Reitz, supra note 3, at 1091–92. 
 251.  Id. 
 252.  Duke, supra note 12, at 1315. 
 253.  Reitz, supra note 3, at 1092. 
 254.  Id. 
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by a majority of the citizenry and those reflected in federal criminal law is 
reminiscent of alcohol Prohibition, when for thirteen years the government 
tried and failed to keep its people from drinking.”255 
These obvious parallels raise the question of whether the approach taken 
to alcohol once Prohibition collapsed provides a model for resolving the 
marijuana federalism conflict.256 Under the post-Prohibition model, the federal 
government retained control of illegal interstate trafficking in alcohol, but 
allowed states room to regulate alcohol use. As an example of the potential 
nexus between alcohol and marijuana regulation in the modern era, Washington 
even placed regulation of marijuana dispensaries under the state liquor control 
board.257 Professor Brannon Denning suggests a constitutional amendment like 
the Twenty-First Amendment, which would legalize marijuana and allocate 
responsibility for its regulation between the states and the federal 
government258—a form of shared federalism.259 
Professor Steven Duke also suggests that the government follow the 
alcohol regulatory model, rescinding the ban, while continuing to restrict 
“interstate commerce in drugs that are unlicensed, mislabeled, inadequately 
identified, or lacking appropriate disclosures and warnings.”260 Like alcohol, 
he suggests, “most regulation would be left to the individual states.”261 Like 
alcohol, some states might limit the distribution of the drug to state-owned 
distribution centers; others might license private individuals or businesses to 
perform these functions.262 Under Duke’s proposal, all states might restrict the 
places where marijuana can be distributed and consumed, as they now restrict 
alcohol and impose sanctions against providing the drug to minors, similar to 
 
 255.  Duke, supra note 12, at 1302. 
 256.  See Denning, supra note 144, at 593 (“The Twenty-First Amendment was the product of 
dissatisfaction with a proscriptive legal regime that had turned otherwise law-abiding citizens into 
criminals and empowered and enriched vast criminal enterprises. Widespread noncompliance 
undermined the rule of law; official efforts to coerce compliance arguably produced concomitant 
infringements on citizens’ civil liberties.”). 
 257.  Baude, supra note 96, at 519. 
 258.  Denning, supra note 144, at 594 (suggesting that “the second-best outcome for state 
experimentation would be legislation that (1) clarified the legal status of state decriminalization or 
compassionate use laws under the CSA and (2) permitted states to regulate marijuana free from the 
strictures of the DCCD”). 
 259.  Id. at 594 (suggesting that doing this “might serve as a vehicle for a wide-ranging national 
debate on drug policy that the country has probably never properly had”). 
 260.  Duke, supra note 12, at 1308. 
 261.  Id. See Mikos, supra note 4, at 761 (warning against further devolving regulatory authority to 
the counties based on the post-prohibition experience with alcohol, which has let “wet counties” 
undermine controls imposed in dry counties, or dry counties to transfer “their harms onto wet counties, 
or both”); see also id. at 760 (postulating that since “alcohol localism has failed to meet expectations, 
why would we expect marijuana localism to fare any better?”). 
 262.  Duke, supra note 12, at 1308. 
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laws against providing alcohol to minors.263 Under the alcohol model, both 
jurisdictions could continue to tax the product’s production and distribution.264 
In 2013, Congressman Jared Polis introduced a bill265 that would have 
exempted marijuana from the CSA and transferred enforcement authority over 
the drug to a “newly renamed Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Marijuana, 
Firearms, and Explosives.”266 Congressman Polis’s bill would also have added 
marijuana to the Wilson Act and the Webb-Kenyon Act, two key federal 
alcohol statutes, completing its integration into the laws governing alcohol 
consumption and distribution.267 His bill would have delegated to the states the 
details of licensing and regulating the marijuana industry, even though it would 
have been the federal government that issued permits to operate a marijuana 
business.268 The federal government might also impose limits on the size of 
marijuana companies to “combat commercialization” and regulate sales to 
minors.269 “Federal marijuana regulation,” according to Kreit, “could look a lot 
like alcohol regulation, as in [Congressman] Polis’s bill, or it could be much 
more restrictive or (less likely) more open.”270 Even under an approach that 
delegated licensing to the states, an alphabet soup of federal agencies would be 
involved in setting standards governing the drug’s production and use, as well 
as thwarting smuggling and trafficking.271 
So maybe the approach taken to alcohol after repeal of the Eighteenth 
Amendment, where control of the substance largely, but not exclusively, 
devolved to the states, would provide an effective fused- or shared-federalism 
regulatory model that could blend federal and state regulation of marijuana. 
The political question is whether the approach is close enough to complete 
federal deregulation of the drug to trigger congressional disapproval. 
 
 263.  Id. Both of Duke’s proposals are consistent with the criteria set out in the Second Cole 
Memorandum. See supra Part II.A; see also Mikos, supra note 4, at 761 (saying studies show state 
imposed regulatory controls short of bans, e.g., minimum drinking ages, beer taxes, more successful at 
reducing auto fatalities, and that adoption of “a broad array of measures, including limits on access, 
police sobriety checkpoints, community mobilization, and training of alcohol vendors, reduced the 
incidence of alcohol-related automobile injuries and other harms in the community”). 
 264.  Duke, supra note 12, at 1308. 
 265.  Ending Federal Marijuana Prohibition Act, H.R. 499, 113th Cong. § 101 (2013). 
 266.  Kreit, supra note 68, at 709–10. 
 267.  Id. 
 268.  Id. at 710. But see Reid, supra note 12, at 183–84 (recommending that State Alcoholic 
Beverage Commissions and/or State Liquor Control Boards “regulate the marijuana industry through the 
issuance of licenses to suppliers/manufactures/growers, wholesalers/processors, and retailers”).  
 269.  Kreit, supra note 68, at 710. 
 270.  Id. 
 271.  Reid, supra note 12, at 183 (“The Federal Trade Commission, the ATF, and the Drug 
Enforcement Administration [] would have to establish and enforce strict regulations that govern the 
production and use of marijuana. The Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) would have to participate 
in the process, if marijuana enters the food supply-chain. The ATF could reduce marijuana smuggling 
and contraband-marijuana trafficking, thereby divesting criminal and terrorist organizations of monies 
derived from illicit activity, and minimize tax revenue losses to the states, and to the federal 
government.”). 
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Each of the approaches discussed above suffers from constitutional 
uncertainty or the need for enabling legislative authority. Additionally, none of 
the approaches discussed in this Part offers a direct solution to what is 
happening on public lands as the enforcement problems remain the same 
regardless of which jurisdiction is regulating the industry. While getting the 
federal government out of the day-to-day marijuana enforcement business 
might help to free up more federal resources to target these illegal operations, 
there probably would still be a numerical imbalance between illegal growers 
and enforcers that favors the former. Nor does any approach get at the root 
cause of the problem—a thriving black market for the drug. Because black 
markets are impervious to normal competitive market forces,272 as long as 
illegally grown marijuana remains less expensive and more available than 
drugs produced legally, public lands will continue to be destroyed to supply 
that market. 
The next Part tackles the last piece of the problem: how to lessen illegal 
marijuana cultivation on public lands by decreasing the demand for it. 
V.  NEW APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OF ILLEGAL CULTIVATION OF 
MARIJUANA 
Given the low likelihood that the federal government will legalize 
marijuana or broadly decriminalize it, which at best may have only a small 
impact on illegal marijuana cultivation, the only way to substantially reduce the 
illegal grow sites in the Sierra Nevada Mountains is to reduce the black market 
supporting those sites. One way to do this is to change the preferences of 
marijuana consumers so that they do not buy illegally produced marijuana, 
which of course depends on the availability of a legal substitute.273 
“The government regularly nudges and prods Americans to behave in 
ways that are better for the environment.”274 Strict enforcement of existing 
laws is one way to encourage good behavior. Taxes, subsidies, technical 
assistance,275 manipulating social norms, public education, shaming bad 
 
 272.  Levy, supra note 2, at 270 (“[B]lack market prices are inflated, because you don’t have true 
market forces of supply and demand driving the price down.”). 
 273.  Carah et al., supra note 9, at 826 (calling for legal clarification of marijuana’s status). 
 274.  Kuh, supra note 189, at 1126–27 (citing as examples carpool lanes that result in faster 
commutes, subsidies to public transportation and hybrid car purchase, sponsorship of public service 
campaigns encouraging good behavior, policing of green marketing claims to avoid consumers being 
misled, etc.); see id. at 1160–61 (“The government regularly alters individual environmental behaviors 
and reduces or increases the environmental impacts of individual behaviors without imposing mandates 
directly on individuals. Most notably, product mandates constrain and, in some cases, extinguish 
individual choice. A variety of subsidies, taxes, and public-information campaigns encourage 
environmentally friendly behaviors, such as the use of public transportation, or discourage 
environmentally harmful behaviors.”). 
 275.  Carah et al., supra note 9, at 826 (“If liberalization proceeds, future efforts to govern the 
environmental effects of marijuana production should include both incentives as well as regulatory and 
enforcement efforts to help legal producers comply with environmental laws and protect environmental 
resources. In legal markets, technical assistance and outreach programs could play a significant role in 
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behavior, and rewarding good behavior can also affect the practices people 
engage in.276 Any one of these extralegal approaches can dissuade malefactors 
from engaging in antisocial, anti-environmental behavior,277 and none 
“glamorize[s] the wrong doing, as in liquor and marijuana prohibition where 
life styles more than societal jeopardy was the key issue.”278 When behavior is 
glamorized, individual “life styles” become more important than “societal 
jeopardy.”279 This makes behavioral change more difficult, especially if the 
force behind the change is the threat of legal sanction.280 However, since none 
of these approaches offers a winning strategy by itself, the discussion ends by 
recommending the application of a policy of “adaptive diversification.” 
Adaptive diversification allows informed experimentation with proposed 
solutions to a problem and the selection of the best one(s).281 
Several of these approaches and adaptive diversification are discussed 
below. 
 
encouraging the adoption of best management practices and voluntary compliance. Similar efforts could 
encourage the management of stream flows that integrate human and ecosystem needs and mitigate 
some of the impacts of agricultural water diversion from natural systems . . . . Other incentive programs, 
such as certification and ecolabeling, have been used widely to help reduce the environmental 
externalities for other agricultural crops and could play a similar role in marijuana production.”). 
 276.  Cf. Ebke, supra note 190, at 686 (discussing how compliance with European Union directives 
is achieved, and saying that “[t]he desire for a good name, the will to play the role demanded, and the 
wish to conform for the sake of the common objectives are almost as powerful a motive among the 
members of the Communities as they are among individuals in national states”). 
 277.  Victoria Jenkins, The Legal Response to Safeguarding Local Environmental Quality, 35 
LEGAL STUD. 648, 656 (2015) (“Nevertheless, it is undoubtedly the case that it is not necessarily 
appropriate to impose sanctions for local environmental crime through the courts. The search for 
appropriate responses to local environmental crime reﬂects wider concerns about the need for more 
innovative approaches to sanctioning in criminal law, particularly for offences that are not considered 
very morally reprehensible.”). 
 278.  Stuart S. Nagel, Incentives for Compliance with Environmental Law, 17 THE AM. BEHAV. 
SCI. 690, 707 (May/June 1974). 
 279.  Id. at 692; but see id. at 690 (“[P]ositive and negative incentives have other effects that may 
need to be considered and controlled such as the degree of (1) cost to the government and thus the 
taxpayers, (2) cost to consumers, especially those who can least afford to pay, (3) cost to the polluter and 
thus to his stockholders, (4) cost to the employees of the polluter, and (5) cost to the general public in 
terms of reduction in fair procedure and respect for the legal system if the incentives are manipulated 
without adequate concern for separating the innocent from the guilty. Likewise, political feasibility or 
likelihood of significant adoption and application should also be considered.”). 
 280.  Michael P. Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance: A Testable Typology of Social Norms in 
Corporate Environmental Compliance, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 101 (2003) (“[T]he greater the 
perceived importance of autonomy, the less likely the individual will respond to threats of formal legal 
sanctions by increasing compliance.  Instead, when the freedom to conduct an activity is very important, 
individuals may react to increased threats to restrict that freedom by simply increasing their commitment 
to the illegal activity.”). 
 281.  See generally Manski, supra note 18. 
Babcock Final Word Doc Headers Whited Out (Do Not Delete)3/14/2017  1:00 PM 
2016] ILLEGAL MARIJUANA CULTIVATION 763 
A.  Possible Ways to Change Individual Preferences 
1.  Strict Enforcement 
One way to influence behavior is to have the government strictly enforce 
against socially undesirable behavior. Often that is the simplest approach to 
take282 and here it could be effective against marijuana dispensaries.283 But 
there are problems with enforcing federal marijuana laws, which may not be 
correctible. 
One of these problems is the lack of federal resources to do the job, as 
discussed earlier in this Article.284 The inadequacy of enforcement resources 
means that the federal government cannot impose the CSA’s harsh penalties 
with sufficient frequency to make a meaningful impact on the prohibited 
behavior.285 Take the situation involving the medical use of marijuana. “More 
than 14.4 million people regularly use marijuana in the United States every 
year, including 4 million who live in states that legalize medical use.”286 
Although only roughly 400,000 of those people are doing this legally under 
state law, “there is no easy way for the federal government to focus its scarce 
resources on them alone.”287 Assuming further that the states did not help with 
federal enforcement in those states, the result would be that “only 0.05 
percent—or roughly 1 in 2000—of medical marijuana users would be 
uncovered by federal authorities” given the current situation.288 The fact that 
the marijuana ban is not being enforced undercuts its deterrent effect.289 
 
 282.  Reid, supra note 12, at 189 (“Criminalizing the production and use of marijuana would prove 
to be an easier option than legalization, since there are underlying state and federal laws that could 
simply be more strictly enforced.”). 
 283.  Id. at 188 (“Strict enforcement by the [Drug Enforcement Administration] would significantly 
cripple most dispensary owners via administrative forfeiture.”). 
 284.  See supra Part III. 
 285.  Mikos, supra note 6, at 1464; see id. (“All told, federal agents made 154,000 arrests in 
2007—30,000 for all drug offenses, including 7,276 for marijuana. These figures amount to only 1 
percent of all criminal arrests, 1.6 percent of all drug arrests, and less than 1 percent of all marijuana 
arrests made in the United States that year.”); see id. at 1465 (“Given limited resources and a huge 
number of targets, the current expected sanction for medical marijuana uses is quite low.”); Kreit, supra 
note 68, at 699 (“But because the federal government depends almost entirely on state law enforcement 
resources to enforce drug prohibition laws, it did not have the resources to deter medical marijuana 
business from openly operating.”); Young, supra note 7, at 794 (“California, Colorado, and other states 
have demonstrated that, at least in some circumstances, states can establish a legal regime contrary to 
federal law simply because the national government lacks the resources and political will to enforce its 
rules without state cooperation.”); cf. Ebke, supra note 190, at 718 (discussing the internal enforcement 
problems within the European Union, and saying “[t]he unavailability of sanctions involves, to some 
extent, the acceptance of the legitimacy of the status quo . . . . Given particularized interests within the 
societies of the member states, voluntary adjustments or changes in the laws of the member states often 
seem too high an expectation, regardless of how rational and desirable the arguments for adjustments 
and changes may be.”). 
     286.     Mikos, supra note 6, at 1464–65. 
 287.  Id. 
 288.  Id. at 1465. 
 289.  Cheng, supra note 189, at 659–62. 
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Some people refrain from illegal behavior because they feel morally 
obliged to obey a legal prohibition.290 These individuals are “prone to obey law 
not because they think it is in their self-interest (narrowly defined) to do so, but 
because it is the right, the moral thing to do; it is what people should do, even 
when they disagree with the law.”291 However, despite this “generalized 
obligation to obey law,” that feeling may not extend to compliance with the 
federal marijuana ban292 because of the frequency with which it is 
violated293—nobody likes to be the fool who observes a law when no one else 
does.294 
Additionally, “[s]ocial learning theory posits that observing unpunished 
inappropriate behavior reduces the inhibition to engage in that behavior,” even 
increasing inappropriate behavior in observers.295 Thus, inadequate federal 
enforcement can actually increase negative behavior to the extent that 
observing unpunished inappropriate behavior reduces any inhibition observers 
might feel about engaging in that behavior.296 
Another problem is that people may think that the federal ban is 
illegitimate or unfair, which may make them less likely to comply with it.297 
 
 290.  Robert D. Cooter, Three Effects of Social Norms on Law: Expression, Deterrence, and 
Internalization, 79 OR. L. REV. 1, 20 (2000) (“The primary way to prompt people to instill civic virtue in 
each other is by aligning law with morality. When the law aligns with morality, individuals who 
cultivate morality necessarily acquire civic virtue. Consequently, the law enlists the force of 
internalization to achieve the ends of the state.”); but see Richard A. Posner, Social Norms, Social 
Meaning, and Economic Analysis of Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 553, 554, 560 (1998) (“I do not myself 
believe that many people do things because they think they are the right thing to do unless they have 
first used the plasticity of moral reasoning to align the ‘right’ with their self-interest. I do not think that 
knowledge of what is morally right is motivated in any serious sense for anyone except a handful of 
saints . . . . [I]n general, you need to appeal to a person’s altruism, fear or pride (sometimes moral pride, 
which is not to be confused with morality) to explain non-self-interested behavior.”). 
 291.  Mikos, supra note 6, at 1472–73. 
 292.  Id. at 1473. 
 293.  Vandenbergh, supra note 280, at 112 (“[P]erceptions of widespread noncompliance 
undermine compliance.”). 
 294.  Mikos, supra note 6, at 1474 (“Congress’s ban may have lost its moral influence because so 
many people flout it, and federal authorities have done little thus far to punish them. In other words, the 
lack of enforcement of the federal ban may have undermined not only the deterrent effect of the ban’s 
sanctions, but also the deterrent effect of the generalized moral obligation to obey the law.”); 
Vandenbergh, supra note 280, at 108 (“[T]hose parties that invest in compliance may react negatively if 
others do not and are not penalized . . . [, and] the parties that comply may perceive themselves as 
‘dupes’ and their commitment to the law compliance norm may diminish.”). 
 295.  Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Deterrence in Tort Law, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 115, 
158–59 (1993). 
 296.  Id. (“Exposure to unpunished transgressions tends to increase prohibited behavior in 
observers.”); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 
358 (1997) (When no one else is obeying the law, submitting “to a burdensome legal duty is likely to 
feel more servile than moral.”). 
 297.  Vandenbergh, supra note 280, at 81 n.71 (“People clearly have a strong predisposition toward 
following the law.  If authorities can tap into such feelings, their decisions will be widely followed. The 
norm of law compliance is thus closely related to the norm of legitimacy. To the extent that an 
individual views an authority as legitimate, studies suggest that an individual is more likely to comply 
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The fact that medical marijuana is legal in many states may lessen the 
obligation people might otherwise feel to obey federal law.298 That feeling may 
be even stronger in states that have allowed marijuana use by public 
referendum, where people will “see themselves collectively as having the 
exclusive right to dictate marijuana policy.”299 In those jurisdictions “the 
federal ban will command very little moral authority.”300 
There are additional problems with enforcing the ban against marijuana 
consumers. Regulation of individual behavior is more likely to be perceived as 
unfair and the desired legal behavior too costly or inconvenient to justify the 
hoped for outcome.301 This reaction can intensify when the undesirable 
behavior has an adverse environmental impact because the costs to the 
individual are more immediately apparent and the benefits from regulation or 
enforcement may not accrue until the future.302 Here, the federal ban on 
marijuana affects current consumers, but the benefit of environmental 
protection will benefit only future generations, if at all.303 Furthermore, the 
environmental benefits that do accrue “are generalized benefits to the collective 
not typically viewed as producing any substantial, immediate benefit at an 
individual level.”304 
 
with the law. This proposition holds true for some individuals even though the required action conflicts 
with their self-interest.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 298.  Mikos, supra note 6, at 1474. 
     299.   Id. 
 300.  Id.; see id. at 1474 n.190 (“Surveys show that people consistently deem voter referenda more 
legitimate that laws passed by their representatives (state or federal).”). 
 301.  Kuh, supra note 189, at 1175; see Michael P. Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV. The 
Individual as Regulated Entity in the New Era of Environmental Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 515, 520 
(2004) (When regulators have tried “to impose restrictions on individual behavior . . . the restrictions 
have been unpopular and have provoked a public backlash.”). 
 302.  Kuh, supra note 189, at 1178 (“Avoiding public opposition to the environmental regulation of 
individuals, whether direct or indirect, may be particularly difficult for a variety of reasons. The benefits 
of regulation may, for example, accrue to future generations or may not be immediate, tangible, or 
obvious. Some strategies that could increase the chances that a measure will pass public balancing might 
include (1) maximizing the benefits achieved by a measure and effectively educating the public about 
those benefits, (2) obscuring the costs imposed on the public, or (3) minimizing the costs imposed on the 
public. Intrusion—whether viewed in terms of invading privacy or in terms of government overreaching 
more generally—is simply a cost that regulation imposes on individuals. Direct mandates on 
environmentally significant behaviors may sometimes impose intrusion costs that indirect methods of 
regulation do not and may also render more transparent the costs—intrusion and others—being imposed 
on individuals. But indirect methods of regulating individuals can also impose intrusion costs and visible 
costs, and such methods are likewise sometimes politically unacceptable. And any measure, whether its 
regulation of environmentally significant individual behaviors is direct or indirect, may be vulnerable to 
opposition if its costs cannot be justified by its benefits.”). 
 303.  See generally Hope M. Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsibility for Improving the 
Environment: Moving Toward a New Environmental Norm, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 117, 124–34 
(2009) (discussing the barriers to changing personal environmental behavior, including cognitive 
dissonance, personal habits, and complexity). 
 304.  Ann Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1231, 1243 (2001). See Michael P. 
Vandenbergh, Order Without Social Norms: How Personal Norm Activation Can Protect the 
Environment, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1101, 1123 (2005) (“[T]he law should induce individuals to believe 
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Direct regulation of individuals, more so than indirect regulation, is likely 
“to spur public objection because it makes the costs borne by individuals 
clearer to those individuals.”305 It may also be difficult for people to understand 
how individual de minimis actions collectively harm the environment—such as 
understanding how smoking a single joint can affect a watershed. This 
attenuated causation can make it more likely that they will perceive, and even 
resent, any actions taken against them as unfair.306 Enforcement of regulations 
affecting individual behavior may necessitate collecting information about that 
behavior or tracking it. These activities may intrude on individual privacy or 
other civil liberties in ways that can raise public objections.307 Public animosity 
toward regulations may increase when enforcement takes place near or in 
homes.308 As most marijuana consumption occurs in the home or other “safe” 
spaces because of the need for secrecy, enforcement of the federal ban is likely 
to trigger a backlash against it.309 
Directly enforcing against individuals, who are indirectly causing 
environmental harm by purchasing marijuana on the black market, would not 
only run the high risk of being perceived as intrusive and unfair, and therefore, 
objectionable to many, but would also be difficult for the federal government to 
do.310 This is because marijuana users “are numerous and spread out” and 
engage in illegal behavior in private, making detection particularly difficult and 
expensive.311 Consequently, technologies making it easier to track and identify 
bad environmental behaviors, like “solo commuting” or improper “disposal of 
household waste,”312 have no relevance to the illegal use of marijuana. 
 
that the environmental problems caused by the behavior are significant . . . and that if they change 
behavior these problems can be ameliorated.”). 
 305.  Kuh, supra note 189, at 1175; see id. at 1181 (“direct regulation, unlike some forms of 
indirect regulation, will often make clear to individuals the costs—including inconvenience, economic 
costs, and limitations on choice—that the government is requiring them to incur in the name of 
environmental protection.”). 
 306.  Id. at 1122. 
 307.  Id. at 1119–20; see Carlson, supra note 304, at 1235 (“When numerous people must act to 
solve a collective action problem and lack the economic incentive to do so, traditional government 
regulation, such as formal law, may be infeasible, ineffectual, or politically difficult. The costs of 
monitoring and enforcement can be prohibitively expensive and may raise privacy concerns.”). 
 308.  Kuh, supra note 189, at 1160; see id. at 1168–69 (“[L]isting cases and observing that ‘our law 
has long recognized that the home provides a kind of special sanctuary in modern life’”) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (citing McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 3150 (2010)); id. at 1170 
(“[S]ubstantive due process cases recognize the home as a private space warranting special protection 
from government invasion. The home is considered ‘the most private of places,’ and laws that would 
require ‘police invasion’ of the home for their enforcement are deemed particularly suspect.”). 
 309.  Government enforcement of restrictions that have been placed on products is generally 
considered less intrusive and less restrictive of individual liberty. Kuh, supra note 189, at 1160. 
 310.  Vandenbergh, supra note 304, at 1103 (“Regulations that seek to direct personal behavior by 
fiat are extremely unpopular, and they are often inefficient and costly to enforce.”). 
 311.  See Kuh, supra note 189, at 1120–21; but see id. at 1122 (“Piggybacking enforcement efforts 
on existing local regulation may also reduce administrative costs.”). 
 312.  Id. at 1121–23. 
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2.  Norm Manipulation 
Another way of changing individual behavior is through manipulating 
norms. “A norm is a social rule that does not depend on government for either 
promulgation or enforcement”313— in other words, “a private alternative” to 
laws314 and a way to change individual behavior the community does not 
approve of. As such, a norm is “an informal obligation that may be internalized 
(and enforced through guilt) or that may arise without internalization (and be 
enforced through external non-legal sanctions such as stigma or ostracism).”315 
Norms thus function as “non-legal rules or obligations” that individuals 
conform to even without the threat of legal sanctions.316 Defying or 
disregarding a social norm imposes a cost on the individual, which can “tip the 
cost-benefit balance in favor of conformity with the norm.”317 In fact, pressure 
to conform to prevailing social norms enables norms to influence the behavior 
of even those whose personal beliefs are not consistent with the norm.318 
Since norms purportedly reflect a social consensus about which behaviors 
are worthy of admiration, they are generally enforced by the community 
withholding its esteem.319 Typical community sanctions are those that 
engender a feeling of shame in the wrongdoer or, for more extreme sanctions, 
expulsion from a social group.320 The threat of community disapproval can 
make norms even more powerful than law as a means of inducing individual 
behavior change.321 
The problems with relying on community disapproval as a way to change 
the behavior of marijuana users are the emerging public consensus that using 
the drug is socially acceptable, albeit illegal, and state legalization of the drug, 
which immunizes people from social sanctions by “signaling public approval of 
 
 313.  Richard A. Posner, Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special Reference to Sanctions, 19 
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 369, 369 (1999); see id. at 382 (“Norms provide a private, decentralized, and 
competitive alternative to government control of social behavior.”). 
 314.  Alex Geisinger, A Group Identity Theory of Social Norms and Its Implications, 78 TUL. L. 
REV. 605, 621 (2004). 
 315.  Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Social Meaning of Environmental Command and Control, 20 
VA. ENVTL. L.J. 191, 200 (2001); see Cooter, supra note 290, at 5 (defining a social norm as “an 
obligation backed by a social sanction”; an obligation as “a statement about what people ought to do, 
such as pay taxes and clean up after their dogs”; a social sanction as a “punishment imposed, not by state 
officials, but by ordinary people, such as shunning a litigious lawyer or refusing to deal with a law firm 
that organizes hostile takeovers”). 
 316.  Carlson, supra note 304, at 1238 (“[B]ecause defiance would subject them to sanction from 
others (typically in the form of disapproval, lowered esteem, or even ostracism) or because they would 
feel guilty for failing to conform to the norm (a so-called internalized norm)”); see Mikos, supra note 6, 
at 1475 (“Like law, and in contrast to personal beliefs or the internalized moral obligation to obey law, 
social norms exert external pressure on individuals to conform. Unlike law, however, that external 
pressure is applied by civil society rather than the government.”). 
 317.  Carlson, supra note 304, at 1238. 
 318.  Mikos, supra note 6, at 1475. 
 319.  Geisinger, supra note 314, at 640. 
 320.  Id. at 608. 
 321.  Mikos, supra note 6, at 1475. 
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once taboo conduct.”322 This makes the desirability of legal compliance 
ambiguous and may decrease any guilt a person might otherwise feel when they 
violate the law.323 
Furthermore, shaming individuals who ignore or violate a social norm, if 
taken too far, can make that person into an “outlaw”—someone who does not 
care about public opinion—and can “spill over” and stigmatize individuals who 
are complying with the norm.324 The problem with marijuana is that everyone 
involved in the marijuana culture is in some way already a federal outlaw. This 
makes shame an ineffective sanction, and its use could trigger a negative 
backlash.325 
People can use heuristics to “neutralize” any feeling of shame by 
“redefining the problem . . . [so] that [it] does not trigger the applicable norm,” 
by putting the blame on someone else, or by not finding an alternative course of 
action to avoid the harm.326 It is easy to assert that using marijuana is not the 
problem, rather it is how the drug is grown, that others are causing the 
environmental harm—here, illegal cultivators—and that no alternative course 
of action to buying illegally produced marijuana exists because of the federal 
prohibition. Even among people who profess to care about the environment, the 
desire to “make their attitudes, beliefs, cognitions, and behaviors as consistent 
as possible” will propel them to avoid information that is inconsistent with 
those beliefs so that they do not feel bad about themselves.327 
Another problem with norms here is that the individuals to whom the 
norm might apply will neither personally benefit from its application, making 
compliance less appealing, nor are they likely to be subject to legal or social 
sanction328 if they violate the norm, because of inadequate federal enforcement 
and the drug’s expanding use. The sheer number of people currently violating 
the federal ban undermines the effect of any legal, let alone social, sanction 
applied to any one of them.329 
Norms may also be ineffective when people do not believe that their 
conduct is causing a problem, like harming the environment.330 So, even if 
 
 322.  Id. at 1478. 
 323.  Vandenbergh, supra note 280, at 85. 
 324.  Nagel, supra note 279, at 700. 
 325.  See generally Babcock, supra note 303, at 159–65 (discussing the positive and negative 
features of shaming undesirable personal behavior). 
 326.  Vandenbergh, supra note 280, at 77.  
 327.  Vandenbergh, supra note 301, at 593–94. 
 328.  Vandenbergh, supra note 304, at 1101 (“One of the greatest problems facing norms theorists 
and regulators is how to induce individuals to act who will not benefit personally and who are not 
subject to legal or social sanctions.”). 
 329.  Id. at 1102 (“[I]n an increasingly crowded society, individuals face numerous situations in 
which acting in their personal interest will harm the collective interest, but their large numbers 
undermine the influence of legal and social sanctions.”). 
 330.  Id. at 1126 (“Perhaps the most important challenge for the theory is whether norm activation 
will occur if an individual believes that all individuals in the aggregate cause an environmental problem 
but that the individual’s personal contribution is inconsequential.”). 
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people are aware of the environmental harm from illegal marijuana cultivation 
on distant public lands, a social norm may not be activated unless they believe 
they personally caused the problem,331 which the attenuated chain of causation 
makes highly unlikely. Professor Ann Carlson thinks that norms have little 
effect on people’s behavior and that the convenience of environmentally 
appropriate alternatives is much more influential.332 Here, where both legal and 
illegal marijuana are inconvenient because of the secrecy surrounding their 
distribution, norms might come into play if one could find legal marijuana to 
buy, especially if it is not too expensive.333 
Despite these problems, laws can have “an expressive effect even in the 
absence of rigorous enforcement.”334 The enactment of the legal mandate sends 
a message that the prohibited behavior is wrong and that engaging in it will be 
“dangerous or depraved” because it is “formally” condemned.335 Even though 
the attitude of Americans toward the morality of using marijuana is ambivalent 
at best,336 marijuana users might still be criticized on moral grounds for 
violating a federal mandate.337 Thus, the federal ban might trigger what is 
called the compliance norm.338 The compliance norm describes a situation 
where, even though the expected benefits of violating the law outweigh the 
 
 331.  Id. at 1126.  
 332.  Carlson, supra note 304, at 1295–96 (“If the desired behavior is very convenient, then 
commitment to a norm in favor of the behavior has little bearing on whether people will participate . . . . 
[T]he more convenient the behavior, the less important a moral commitment to the behavior is in 
encouraging participation and the greater the number of people who will participate.”). 
 333.  Id. at 1279 (“Curbside [recycling] programs . . . [that] allow households to display their 
compliance with a recycling norm very visibly to their neighbors” may account for their success as 
much as reducing the cost of the behavior “by making it easier for individuals to recycle.”). 
 334.  Kuh, supra note 189, at 1122; see Vandenbergh, supra note 315, at 202 (“[L]aw is expressive 
in the sense that it can signal, reinforce or change social meaning . . . , [and] the public can receive a 
message conveyed by law, whether intended or unintended, and that this message can have an impact on 
perceptions about the sources of a problem and on the social norms that develop in response to those 
perceptions.”); Vandenbergh, supra note 301, at 600 (“[A]lthough command and control measures are 
unlikely to be effective as the exclusive instrument for steering individual environmentally significant 
behavior, their expressive effects, in combination with information regulation and other measures, may 
be quite important.”). 
 335.  Mikos, supra note 6, at 1470. 
 336.  Manski, supra note 18, at 999 (“Drug control policy has long been normatively contentious, 
with Americans varying in their moral judgment of drug use and in their concern with the collateral 
consequences of drug law enforcement.”). 
 337.  Duke, supra note 12, at 1306. 
 338.  See Vandenbergh, supra note 280, at 123 (“The norm of law compliance (and the norms of 
human health and environmental protection, to the extent they are implicated by the violation) thus may 
lead individuals to develop more compliant behavior intentions immediately upon detection . . . [while,] 
the norms of good faith and autonomy . . . may explain why increasing the likelihood of detection may 
have only a limited effect on compliance.”);  see also Mikos, supra note 6, at 1470 (“To the extent 
lawmakers can shape preferences and redefine self-interest, they can diminish citizens’ desire to engage 
in prohibited activity without having to impose costly legal sanctions.”).  
Babcock Final Word Doc Headers Whited Out (Do Not Delete)3/14/2017  1:00 PM 
770 ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 43:723 
costs of doing so, and thus there are no strong “legal incentives to obey,” 
people will still obey the law.339 
Through enacting laws and people’s predilection to obey laws, lawmakers 
“can shape social norms by manipulating whether society condemns or 
condones a given behavior, similarly to the way they can shape personal beliefs 
about that behavior.”340 However, because “norms are entrenched; lawmakers 
must take norms as they find them” and have little control over whether the 
undesirable behavior is condemned or condoned.341 In the case of marijuana, 
an increasing number of people are condoning, not condemning its use. 
An additional problem with relying on the expressive strength of the 
federal ban to change behavior is that its expressive strength is weaker than 
contrary state laws because states are generally seen by their citizens as more 
trustworthy.342 States also usually have more relevant, up-to-date information 
about social norms than the federal government because “comparatively 
majoritarian-friendly [state] lawmaking processes,” like referenda and ballot 
initiatives, enable state laws to stay current with changes in societal views.343 
State laws additionally “convey more accurate information about local norms,” 
which is important because local norms are far more influential than “norms 
held by distant strangers.”344 Thus state laws legalizing medical marijuana are 
broadcasting a more current and relevant signal concerning societal approval or 
disapproval of medical marijuana. They are arguably sending out a clearer 
signal as well because currently all but seven states and the District of 
Columbia address only the medical use of marijuana; whereas the CSA 
addresses many topics, “meaning the signal it broadcasts on any one of them 
(e.g., should marijuana be legal) will be quite noisy.”345 
The enactment of a new law may reduce uncertainty about norms, 
particularly if those norms are changing,346 as they are with respect to 
marijuana. State marijuana laws have all been enacted after passage of the 
CSA.347 The enactment of these laws in thirteen states, frequently by “wide 
 
 339.  Mikos, supra note 6, at 1469 (“At this point, a neoclassical economist would probably 
surmise that the federal ban does not significantly reduce the use or supply of marijuana because the 
expected legal sanctions for disobeying the ban are, for many people, outweighed by the expected 
benefits of disobedience. Contrary to this prediction, however, people often do obey the law, even when 
they do not expect to be punished by the government for non-compliance – i.e., even when they lack 
strong legal incentives to obey.”); see Carlson, supra note 304, at 1263 (Laws “encourage cooperation 
by taking advantage of a more generalized norm of law abidingness.”). 
 340.  Mikos, supra note 6, at 1475. 
 341.  Id. at 1476. 
 342.  Id. at 1471. 
 343.  Id. at 1477. 
 344.  Id. at 1478. 
 345.  See id. at 1478 n.202. 
 346.  Id. at 1476. 
 347.  Id. at 1478 (“[S]tarting with California in 1996 and continuing through Michigan in 2008, 
[t]hese state laws have been supported by large and growing majorities. Support for the most recently 
enacted measure—Michigan’s Proposition 1—topped 63 percent.”). 
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margins,” signals that the citizens in those states are “more likely to support 
than to censure medical use of marijuana.”348 This means there is no social 
norm condemning medical use of marijuana in those states; certainly there is no 
consensus in those states to censure that behavior through shaming or 
otherwise.349 And while a federal law that comes into being only after a lot of 
effort and time “usually signal[s] a strong national consensus and norm,” the 
very fact that it can take years to produce that law, which once enacted is rarely 
changed, allows the message of the original law to fade.350 Thus, recently 
enacted state laws create a more relevant, localized social norm, signaling 
society’s approval of certain uses of marijuana and constraining “Congress’s 
already limited ability to impose legal sanctions on those who violate the 
federal ban.”351 
Therefore, the use of norms to induce behavioral change in individual 
marijuana users is sufficiently problematic and cannot be relied on as the only 
strategy to end the black market in marijuana and the drug’s illegal cultivation. 
Although like strict enforcement, norms may be part of an overall strategy to 
encourage behavior change in some circumstances. 
3.  Financial Incentives 
One possible way to change individual preferences is through financial 
incentives, like rewards and subsidies, and disincentives like taxes or fines. 
One such strategy is using taxes, or alternatively, tax relief, to encourage 
good behavior by an industry and its customers. Because taxing black-market 
marijuana simply passes the cost onto consumers,352 it might encourage 
consumers to purchase legally produced marijuana because the price may be 
lower. Conversely, tax rewards, like eliminating the sales tax on legal 
marijuana, and subsidies, like refunding part of the purchase price for legal 
marijuana, might encourage good behavior.353 
 
 348.  Id.  
 349.  Id. 
 350.  Id. at 1477. 
 351.  Id. at 1478–79 (citing as an example jurors who “may be unwilling to convict people who use 
marijuana for medical purposes (or the people who help them) if they know that local society generally 
approves of medical marijuana”). 
 352.  Nagel, supra note 279, at 694 (“The main disadvantage of such a tax is that it will be passed 
on to the consumers of the products involved to the extent that it can be passed on without the 
consumers shifting to other products or simply reducing their use of the products involved.”). 
 353.  Id. at 696 (“Tax rewards and subsidies, on the other hand, tend to emphasize positive 
incentives, although the withdrawal of a tax reward or subsidy which a firm had been receiving can be 
thought of as a punishment, especially if the firm’s competitors are continuing to receive the tax reward 
or subsidy.”); see Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. 
REV. 21, 99 (2001) (noting how “[d]eposit and refund measures to promote recycling or proper disposal 
of beverage containers or used batteries require consumers to pay a fee on purchase of disposable items, 
which is refunded when they comply with command requirements specifying the proper method of 
disposal or return”). 
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Taxing marijuana, regardless of whether it is produced legally or illegally, 
could also produce tax revenues of between $10 billion per year and $14 billion 
per year, depending on the tax rate.354 However, taxing just illegally produced 
marijuana may not increase the price sufficiently to dissuade people from 
buying it, especially if the costs of producing legal marijuana go up in response 
to regulatory compliance costs, and will not “eliminate all criminal activities 
and elements associated with the production and use of marijuana.”355 On the 
other hand, tax revenues could be used to mitigate the environmental harms 
caused by illegal marijuana cultivation, such as by restoring damaged 
watersheds,356 and to fund monitoring of the environmental impacts of both 
legal and illegal marijuana cultivation.357 “The scale of the existing marijuana 
markets in California and elsewhere suggests that taxation and fines could fund 
these measures.”358 
Rewarding good behavior can encourage it.359 However, Professor 
Michael Vandenbergh warns that rewards create a risk that their psychological 
effects might “undermine” their effectiveness, discouraging rather than 
encouraging the desired behavior.360 Professor Robert Cooter says rewarding 
good behavior with the goal of enhancing individual civic virtue is difficult for 
government officials to do because they lack necessary information about 
 
 354.  Reid, supra note 12, at 185 n.109 (“Revenue from taxation of marijuana sales would range 
from $2.4 billion per year if marijuana were taxed like ordinary consumer goods to $6.2 billion if it were 
taxed like alcohol or tobacco.”) (quoting JEFFREY MIRON, THE BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS OF 
MARIJUANA PROHIBITION, (2005), www.prohibitioncosts.org/); see Mulkern, supra note 30, (estimating 
that a new law, the Control, Regulate and Tax Adult Use of Marijuana Act, if passed, “could raise $1 
billion or more in revenues”). 
 355.  Reid, supra note 12, at 185. 
 356.  Reitz, supra note 3, at 1111–12 (“[A] system of taxation and regulation similar to alcohol 
would produce combined savings and tax revenues of $10-14 billion per year, a portion of which could 
be spent on mitigating the environmental impacts of legal and illegal marijuana cultivation.”); see 
Mulkern, supra note 30 (reporting 20 percent of the tax revenues projected to result from a recently 
proposed California law are earmarked for environmental restoration and protection, including “for the 
cleanup, remediation, and restoration of environmental damage in watersheds affected by marijuana 
cultivation and related activities”). 
 357.  Carah et al., supra note 9, at 827.  
 358.  Id. Dispersing revenues earned through taxing marijuana from any source to other state 
government departments like health or education might overcome resistance to legalizing and then 
regulating the drug; see id. at 826 (“Colorado and Washington State both allocate their projected $67 
million and $389 million tax revenues, respectively, from legal recreational marijuana sales to state 
funds supporting public health and education.”); see also Hudak, supra note 63, at 663 (commenting that 
Colorado uses tax revenue not only to fund its MED and related policy areas, including “education, 
prevention, and public safety . . . [i]t also delivers a portion of funds to unrelated areas like school 
construction. The system allows for more regulatory stability, creating an agency that is self-funded, 
while using the excess to ensure that other policy groups have a stake in the success of the new 
marijuana industry.”). See Reitz, supra note 3, at 1112. 
 359.  Cooter, supra note 290, at 19 (“To induce people to internalize values, the state must reward 
citizens for having civic virtue.”); see id. at 19–20 (government officials often “bestow honors, awards, 
and praise, as well as their opposites (dishonor, punishments, and condemnations)”). 
 360.  Vandenbergh, supra note 301, at 608. 
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individual character.361 Awards are also expensive and difficult to administer 
and only rewarding “exemplary behavior” suggests that complying with legal 
requirements is “optional rather than obligatory.”362 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, fining consumers who buy illegal 
marijuana may backfire by signaling that individuals may engage in a socially 
bad behavior as long as they pay a “price.”363 Increasing the size of the fines, 
or perhaps “escalating” them for repeat offenders, might make the fine look 
more like a penalty than a price for engaging in the activity.364 If fines are 
accompanied by a public education campaign, it might lessen the possibility 
that they would be considered merely a cost of doing business.365 
But there are overarching problems with using fines to encourage good 
behavior by marijuana users. And that is the perceived unfairness of penalizing 
individuals who engage in none of the environmentally harmful activities that 
attend the drug’s illegal production, and the difficulty of finding, let alone 
catching, illegal marijuana producers to make things fairer. 
4.  Public Education, Information Dispersal, and Labeling 
One way of changing individual preferences is through public information 
or education campaigns.366 A well-designed public information campaign, 
when accompanied by “other regulatory instruments,” can work.367 Campaigns 
against smoking and littering, as well as those supporting seatbelts, recycling, 
and properly disposing of hazardous waste and used motor oil are examples of 
successful public information campaigns.368 Another way of educating 
consumers is signaling desired behavior about which product to buy through 
some system of labeling or certification, as Professor Eric Biber suggests. The 
strengths and weakness of each approach are discussed below. 
Since 1998, the federal government has spent over $1.5 billion on an 
“aggressive” anti-marijuana advertisement campaign to discourage marijuana 
use, particularly by the young, “by portraying the drug as dangerous, wicked, 
and uncool.”369 This campaign has neither reduced the amount of marijuana 
consumed nor changed public attitudes toward the drug.370 This failure may be 
attributed to the fact that the public does not “trust the messenger,” since “the 
persuasiveness of any campaign may depend as much on its source as its 
 
 361.  Cooter, supra note 290, at 19–20. 
 362.  Shuman, supra note 295, at 156. 
 363.  Kuh, supra note 189, at 1179 n.270. 
 364.  Id.  
 365.  Id. at 1179 n.270. 
 366.  Mikos, supra note 6, at 1470 (“A second way lawmakers can change internal preferences is 
by ‘educating’ (or more pejoratively, indoctrinating) the public.”). 
 367.  Vandenbergh, supra note 301, at 614. 
 368.  Id. 
 369.  Mikos, supra note 6, at 1470. 
 370.  Id. 
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contents.”371 Generally, people trust state messengers more than federal ones, 
giving states a greater advantage than their federal peers at “manipulating” 
individual behavior.372 The federal message’s accuracy does not matter; if the 
government “suffers a trust deficit,” it will have trouble “nudging people’s 
beliefs in the direction” it wants.373 Moreover, the federal government’s 
message about the dangers of marijuana is directly contradicted by state 
legalization of medical marijuana, which signals to potential consumers that its 
use is not dangerous, “wicked,” or a “reckless indulgence”; rather it is about 
“compassion and hope for the sick.”374 
Awareness of environmental harms, even more than human-health harms, 
can “activate a norm and influence [individual] behavior.”375 Therefore, 
information about the adverse effects of illegal cultivation on public lands 
might change the behavior of consumers by helping them “understand the 
wider impacts of their behavior.376 But, when a problem is out of sight, as with 
illegal marijuana cultivation on remote tracts of public lands, it can be harder 
for people to be concerned about it.377 On the one hand, “studies of 
environmental behavior support the hypothesis that information about the 
aggregate effects of individual behavior can activate norms and change 
behavior.”378 On the other hand, if people do not believe that “the mean, 
aggregate and relative effects of their behavior” are significant, concrete norms, 
like protecting the environment, may not be triggered, and environmental 
protective behavior may not happen.379 So, linking the use of illegal marijuana 
 
 371.  Id. at 1471. 
 372.  Id. at 1471–72. 
 373.  Id. at 1471. Young argues that this trust deficit is “one reason that modern-day nullification 
can be successful. When state governments are more trusted than the Feds, state judgments about, say, 
the appropriateness of marijuana use more readily displaces the moral suasion of federal law.” Young, 
supra note 7, at 792. 
 374.  Mikos, supra note 6, at 1472.  
 375.  Vandenbergh, supra note 280, at 97; see Stewart, supra note 353, at 140 (noting that 
“disclosure of health risks” can be “uninformative (because they fail to convey magnitude of the risks 
posed by different substances) and alarmist,” and that “too much information may overwhelm 
consumers, or simply cause them to disregard it entirely”).  
 376.  Jenkins, supra note 277, at 674; see id. (discussing the problem of local environmental 
harms); id. at 673 (“The educational value of a process of ‘community justice’ can also extend to the 
wider community; and can be viewed as a means of ‘social learning’ to support environmental 
citizenship: ‘In broad terms, learning is supposed to take place when individuals and organisations [sic] 
appreciate that their private interests are closely associated with broader social interests such as 
environmental protection.’ This leads on to a second important assertion of this paper, that there should 
be greater attention to education in safeguarding local environmental quality.”). 
 377.  Cf. id. at 655–56 (“[L]ocal environmental crime suffers from a lack of moral opprobrium, 
which makes it difﬁcult to provide an appropriate sanction. This is a problem that plagues environmental 
crime more generally, but is considered particularly signiﬁcant in the context of local crimes.”) 
 378.  Vandenbergh, supra note 304, at 1127. 
 379.  Id. at 1129. 
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to the environmental harms caused by its cultivation might make the federal 
government’s anti-marijuana campaign more successful.380 
However, public information and education campaigns that try to tie a 
single toke to the massive environmental harms on public lands from 
marijuana’s illegal cultivation are subject to substantial uncertainties and 
tenuous linkages. To establish that link creates a danger of “information 
overload, leading people to simply disregard or discount the communication or 
distort it through simplification.”381 While simple, descriptive information 
works better than hortatory statements about an individual’s obligation to take a 
certain action,382 if the target of the campaign thinks that the desired behavior 
is not in their interest and engaging in bad behavior is an “ingrained” habit, the 
campaign may also be ineffective.383 In the case of using marijuana, both may 
be true. 
Even when information about environmental harm is effectively 
displayed, people have to be willing and able to process that information 
properly and act on it appropriately.384 Most people “have limited time, energy, 
and attention” to do this.385 People also use “heuristics” formed by “their prior 
experiences to process information and deal with uncertainty.”386 Here, to the 
extent that there are heuristics associated with marijuana, they are positive and 
not associated with environmentally harmful activities. Another obstacle is that 
the average marijuana smoker may not have sufficient interest in the 
environment to demand an environmentally benign product, like legal 
marijuana.387 
Product labels, another type of public information or education campaign, 
can be effective where product choice can have an environmental effect, like 
 
 380.  Shuman, supra note 295, at 162 (“[P]eople tend to evaluate information based upon the way 
information is framed”); see Vandenbergh supra note 301, at 614–15 (listing factors for a successful 
campaign as including “external constraints (e.g., the existence or lack of infrastructure for recycling), 
the characteristics of the population in which the behavior occurs (e.g., the existence of close-, 
intermediate-, or loose-knit groups) and the extent to which the behavioral change conveys a tangible 
personal benefit to the individual (e.g., the tangible safety benefits of seat belt use versus the intangible 
psychic benefits of recycling).”). 
 381.  Stewart, supra note 353, at 141. 
 382.  Vandenbergh, supra note 304, at 1138 (“Studies indicate that the alternative approach often 
taken – hortatory information that highlights the individual’s personal obligation to act—can have a 
‘boomerang effect.’ Instead of changing behavior, the information may induce the individual to believe 
that she will feel less satisfaction if she alters her behavior or to believe that her personal freedom is 
being restricted.”). 
 383.  Vandenbergh, supra note 301, at 610. 
 384.  Stewart, supra note 353, at 141. 
 385.  Id.  
 386.  Id. (“[P]eople use heuristics, including those based on their prior experiences, to process 
information and deal with uncertainty. Their perceptions of risks are affected by socioeconomic 
variables, and by their psychological saliency and accessibility may produce distortions.”).  
 387.  Id. at 135.  
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choosing legally, as opposed to illegally, grown marijuana.388 But studies show 
that so-called “eco-labels” only affect consumer behavior when considerations 
like the product’s price and quality are the same.389 Therefore, the effectiveness 
of any marijuana label at swaying consumer preferences will depend on the 
price of illegally grown marijuana. Additionally, for eco-labels to be effective 
their message must be easily understood by consumers and be “trustworthy.”390 
Eco-labels are not successful when consumers are not aware of or not interested 
in the information they contain.391 
Biber’s proposed certification program, which identifies legally cultivated 
marijuana, is a form of eco-labeling.392 He bases his optimism about this 
approach on the fact that a “non-trivial proportion of the consumers of 
marijuana in the United States are higher-income, left-of-center, and generally 
sympathetic to environmental causes.”393 He believes that his certification 
program will increase the demand for legally grown marijuana, which might 
reduce the demand for black-market marijuana, putting “market pressure on 
marijuana growers to reduce their impacts” to compete with certified legal 
cultivators.394 But, Biber recognizes that there will always be consumers who 
are more concerned about price than the environmental harm a particular 
desirable product causes.395 
There are other problems with Biber’s proposal that he also readily admits. 
For example, the “murky legal status” of marijuana might make it difficult to 
get growers to “come out of the shadows” to gain certification for their 
product.396 For certification to work there must be enforceable regulatory 
standards397—again problematic in the shadow of potential federal 
enforcement of the CSA—and these standards must be sufficiently stringent to 
actually protect the environment.398 And any certification program must be an 
effective public education program to be sure that “consumers are aware of the 
problem, the existence of the certification system as a possible solution to the 
problem, and can easily identify and purchase products that are certified.”399 
 
 388.  Vandenbergh, supra note 304, at 1138, n.158 (“For example, the focus of eco-labeling on the 
consumer’s point of purchase for a vehicle will miss the effects that arise from driving style, such as 
driving speed and idling.”).  
 389.  Id. at 1134–35.  
 390.  Stewart, supra note 353, at 137. 
 391.  Id. at 139.  
 392.  See Biber, supra note 31. 
 393.  Id. 
 394.  Id. 
 395.  Id. 
 396.  It would also be difficult for participants in any certification system to enforce any contractual 
arrangement in court as long as the drug is illegal. Id. 
 397.  Id. 
 398.  Id. (“[C]ertification standards may not be high enough to protect the environment, and the 
non-profits or institutions doing the certification may not adequately ensure that the standards are 
actually being met by certified companies.”). 
 399.  Id.; see Kuh, supra note 189, at 1177 (“Mandates are more likely to succeed when they do not 
impose disproportionate burdens on a select few, when they do not unduly transgress the home, when 
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The illegality of the product, however, makes such widespread public 
marketing campaigns difficult, to put it mildly.400 Nonetheless, Biber remains 
optimistic that if marijuana is decriminalized, a certification program might 
work “so long as there are proactive efforts to try and build up a demand 
among consumers for low-impact marijuana production.”401 
B.  Adaptive Diversification 
This review of possible approaches to reducing the demand for illegally 
grown marijuana shows that each has problems; none offers a perfect solution. 
While a law, like the federal ban, can have an expressive effect that can help 
support positive social norms, this will not happen here where that consensus is 
moving in the opposite direction and the federal government’s message about 
the dangers of marijuana is being directly undercut by state legalization. 
Financial incentives are ineffective if they seek to reward good behavior or 
punish bad behavior when the good behavior cannot be exercised because 
legally produced marijuana is not available, and fines can boomerang if they 
appear unfair. Nor can any public information or education program that extolls 
the environmental benefits of buying legal marijuana have any impact because 
of the meaningless of that message to the average consumer. And hanging over 
all of these approaches is the threat of federal enforcement, to the extent that all 
of them require that legally produced marijuana be available to consumers. 
But in combination, or tried in different contexts, they might be 
successful. Professor Charles Manski calls such an approach adaptive 
diversification and suggests its application to drug policy in general.402 
“Adaption” is a well-known concept from conservation biology, which allows 
lessons learned from experience to modify an approach to a problem.403 
Diversification means that losses that occur from a single approach, what 
Manski refers to as putting “all eggs in one basket,” are avoided.404 
 
they are designed to minimize inconvenience and other costs to the public, and when they are effectively 
‘sold’ to the public through communication and demonstration of the measure’s benefits.”). 
 400.  Biber, supra note 31. 
 401.  Id. 
 402.  Manski, supra note 18, at 1005. 
 403.  See id. at 1006 (“The idea of adaptive diversification is to use the lessons learned from 
observation of earlier outcomes to update the allocation of persons to policies later on.”); see Hudak, 
note 63, at 652 (identifying adaptive regulations as those regulations that “embrace[] regulatory 
lookback and process-oriented learning” as well as “changes in culture in state and local government, 
among interest groups, and among the public”); Robert L. Fischman & Jeffrey B. Hyman, The Legal 
Challenge of Protecting Animal Migrations As Phenomena of Abundance, 28 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 173, 214 
(2010) (“While existing scientific tools are inadequate to this task, the challenge is important enough 
that a legal response to migration conservation should build in adaptive management experiments to 
explore effective approaches.”); id. at 204–05 (“[E]cosystem management emphasizes three elements 
critical to successful transboundary coordination: maintenance of ecological integrity, collaborative and 
cooperative decision making, and adaptive management continually adjusting to the unexpected.”). 
 404.  Manski, supra note 18, at 1006.  
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While Manski proposes using states as laboratories to try out different 
approaches to drug control,405 this Article recommends its application to 
changing the preferences of marijuana consumers. Since adaptive 
diversification would allow for trying more than one of the methods for 
changing personal behavior described above, it might offer a way to both find 
and then tailor the best approach to the circumstances in which it is applied. 
Doing this would also help cope with uncertainty about which approaches 
might work, perhaps even reducing uncertainty over time as divergent 
approaches either succeed or fail.406 However, “[a]n iterative process such as 
adaptive management has both direct implementation costs and opportunity 
costs.”407 Moreover, since some of the behavioral approaches described in this 
Article have not been tested with respect to marijuana consumption, before 
field testing any one of them, lessons learned from prior experiments must be 
passed forward to officials running the next one.408 
CONCLUSION 
Illegal marijuana cultivation on public lands is causing massive 
environmental harm. Growing consumer demand for the drug coupled with 
state legalization of its use fuels the black market for it. The illegal grow sites 
are so profitable that the Mexican drug cartels that operate many of them have 
switched from importing the drug into the United States to exporting the cash 
they earn from these operations back to Mexico. The federal government lacks 
the resources to wage what would be a difficult and costly campaign to 
eradicate illegal marijuana cultivation on its lands and instead uses its limited 
resources to ineffectually enforce the federal marijuana ban. Decriminalization 
of the drug might squeeze out the illegally produced product as the drug 
becomes more widely available. But the likelihood of this happening is 
extremely low. Opt out or waiver programs and federal tolerance of criminal 
activity raise constitutional problems, and cooperative or fused regulation, 
while perhaps less politically contentious, will similarly have little direct 
impact on marijuana’s illegal cultivation. 
 
 405.  Id. at 1008; id. at 1007 (commenting on how our federal system allows different laws to apply 
in different states, allowing adaptive diversification at the state level); see New State Ice Co. v. 
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 406.  Manski, supra note 18, at 1008. 
 407.  Alejandro E. Camacho and Robert L. Glicksman, Legal Adaptive Capacity: How Program 
Goals and Processes Shape Federal Land Adaptation to Climate Change, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2016) at 737. 
 408.  See Manski, supra note 18, at 1006 (“The idea of adaptive diversification is to use the lessons 
learned from observation of earlier outcomes to update the allocation of persons to policies later on.”); 
see Hudak, supra note 63, at 652 (identifying adaptive regulations as those regulations that “embrace[] 
regulatory lookback and process-oriented learning” as well as “changes in culture in state and local 
government, among interest groups, and among the public.”).  
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The key is reducing demand for the illegal drug by changing public buying 
preferences. While these may change in response to the approaches discussed 
in this Article, even they will be ineffective if there is no legal alternative drug. 
Nonetheless, the author believes that the analysis of these different approaches 
and the application of the concept of adaptive diversification to them hold 
promise when, as must happen, the drug is finally decriminalized, allowing 


































We welcome responses to this Article. If you are interested in submitting a response for our online 
companion journal, Ecology Law Currents, please contact cse.elq@law.berkeley.edu. Responses to 
articles may be viewed at our website, http://www.ecologylawquarterly.org. 
 
 
Babcock Final Word Doc Headers Whited Out (Do Not Delete)3/14/2017  1:00 PM 
780 ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 43:723 
 
 
